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by pengaru
1283 days ago
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It's not like it was ever a safe assumption to blindly dump core to a process' CWD. It was just a convenient option in a developer-centric UNIX mindset, in lieu of anything better. Sometimes daemons run with a CWD changed somewhere rarely if ever written to at runtime, and presumed to primarily contain information intended for sharing. It's not hard to imagine a security-conscious daemon that's done both chroot() and chdir() into a path intended for publishing information out of, and not generally intended for the daemon to write into except by privileged users/publishers. When that daemon spuriously dumps core into its CWD now you have potentially sensitive information sitting in the published tree, e.g. maybe the credentials of the privileged users are in that core file. |
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If they just tried to write to cwd there would be a blogpost about “systemd loses coredumps if your app directory is read-only” which isn’t some theoretical problem, it’s containers.
There was no way to really win here.