Each view of the world has things it explains well, and things it struggles to explain. Some views do a better job overall than others.
In terms of idealist and dualist views of reality, the claims that there's fundamentally just minds, or fundamentally both minds and physical stuff, are very likely to entail that there is some kind of ensoulment that happens. Perhaps it's required for these views.
While I lean towards a type of idealist view myself, and I think overall it does a better job of explaining various matters than a physicalist view, how exactly ensoulment works is one of the places where these views are at their weakest. I don't think there's any contradiction here or problem for a view like mine, I just think that the physicalist account does a nicer job of explaining things in this specific corner. But that point in physicalism's favour here isn't enough to balance out the places it doesn't do so well (e.g., its complete inability to even begin to explain qualia).
The core point of my post though was that pointing to the continuum of complexity is an argument that would only have weight with people who already have a particular belief in common with you -- that is, that physical complexity of the right sort is somehow relevant to the question of whether something has experiences.
In terms of idealist and dualist views of reality, the claims that there's fundamentally just minds, or fundamentally both minds and physical stuff, are very likely to entail that there is some kind of ensoulment that happens. Perhaps it's required for these views.
While I lean towards a type of idealist view myself, and I think overall it does a better job of explaining various matters than a physicalist view, how exactly ensoulment works is one of the places where these views are at their weakest. I don't think there's any contradiction here or problem for a view like mine, I just think that the physicalist account does a nicer job of explaining things in this specific corner. But that point in physicalism's favour here isn't enough to balance out the places it doesn't do so well (e.g., its complete inability to even begin to explain qualia).
The core point of my post though was that pointing to the continuum of complexity is an argument that would only have weight with people who already have a particular belief in common with you -- that is, that physical complexity of the right sort is somehow relevant to the question of whether something has experiences.