[rogers18445]

Prisoner's dilemma has a Nash equilibrium where defection is the best move regardless of anything else that happens. If you change the game to be a repetitive 'prisoner's dilemma' with the same actors the best strategy would be tit for tat.

[vkou]

Yes, and this kind of prisoner's dillema isn't an accurate description of the hypothetical one. When it comes to the DOJ making a case against two people, both of them co-operating will likely get both of them harsher sentencing than what the defector will get.

That's why underlings have strong incentives to defect, and defect quickly. (Defection is also rarely an option for the person at the top of the pyramid.)

[notahacker]

Yep. Lack of realistic prospect of cooperation working and the asymmetry are key here. I don't think any option either or both of them can take will save Sam, but Sam could possibly save Caroline from the most serious charges by taking full responsibility for the decision to transfer FTX customer funds to Alameda (except I suspect there are other issues with Alameda's compliance they could still nail her for)

Caroline's option to save Caroline regardless of what Sam does by testifying looks a lot better.

[saeranv]

If I recall correctly, the best strategy for repetitive prisoners dilemma *with communication*, is cooperation though.

[rogers18445]

'with communication' does a lot of work here. tit for tat is a strategy where you start with the positive-for-both-parties strategy and then just copy whatever the other party did last time.

[nostromo95]

Yes but the only way repeated cooperation can be maintained is if players can “punish” defectors by also defecting for a certain # of turns (thus making the PV of breaking ranks and defecting < keeping cooperating for every player).

SBF’s situation is different in that the game ends as soon as someone defects.