| A lot to unpack here. First, I don’t think a civil suit by people caught by the hash-checking would be the remedy any of them would seek. More than likely, they would be trying to convince a court that Apple, acting on behalf of the government, violated their rights by searching their device without a warrant. The remedy they’d likely be seeking would be to have the “fruit of the poisonous tree” (Apple pun intended) excluded in their criminal prosecution. I guess maybe they could file a civil suit afterwards but I’m having a little trouble imagining the assemblage of a class around which to file a class action since (allegedly) this hash matching system should “catch” innocent people extremely rarely. And what duty does Apple owe to users? The duty not to inform the police that they might be committing a crime? This seems pretty shaky. The problem with all this is the liability they’d be seeking to impose on Apple is specifically relieved by 18 U.S.C. 2259 (barring recklessness, malice, or a disconnect between apples action and 2258A). The other thing is that “forwarding the results on[ ]to the government for the purposes of law enforcement” explicitly, under Miller, is not government action. It’s the law enforcement function itself that would be interpreted as state action. > How is it different to charge for a subscription to an icloud folder vs a paid substack? I think the answer is that liability for failure to moderate substack might be relieved under section 230 of the CDA[0], while liability for the act of moderating Apple’s cloud by scanning hashes and reporting hits to the FBI would be relieved under 18 U.S.C. 2259. [0]: assuming, of course, su stack didn’t/shouldn’t have known about the offense. Once they know they have a 2259A duty to report. |