[V_Terranova_Jr]

There is a kernel of truth in what you say, but only that. The article is basically right, but I would argue severely undersells the atrocity of an acquisition the F-35 represents. It's certainly a poorer dogfighter than the equivalent level of technology applied to developing a top-level dogfighter (like an upgraded F-22), and is truly ungainly. None of that is at odds with it also being an unparalleled capability.

The biggest challenge in any dialogue about the F-35, like NASA's SLS, is that it's hard to separate how one feels about the acquisition itself vs. the end product. If you're a mission planner, you want the F-35's capabilities and you don't care about the ugly history of how the capability became available. If you're a taxpayer, you should be angry at how poorly managed the F-35 program was and the profligate sunk costs. Any attempt to collapse judgment about the F-35 onto a single axis will lead to low-quality discussions.

One can validly be wary that exalting the capabilities will lead to future acquisitions which learn no lessons from the F-35 because in the end, everyone will just praise the delivered capability after you weather the storm. From my vantage point in DoD aerospace, there is certainly a widespread recognition of the baggage associated with the F-35.

One thing is for certain - wishing they would just stop all production and start over is pure fantasy. There is too much commitment and reliance on these aircraft being in the force mix across many nations. It's not going to happen.

[RF_Savage]

Is dogfighting relevant in todays world of NLOS missiles?

[V_Terranova_Jr]

Current military thinking is "No" - the expectation, via lots of simulation, analysis, recent history, large-scale military exercises, and intel is that advanced weapons systems make dogfighting increasingly unlikely. Where it does happen, capability aspects other than pure kinematic superiority will make a big difference. And before anyone smugly reminds us all of Vietnam, they should refresh themselves on the lessons learned from the '91 Gulf War.

[elabajaba]

Not to mention in Vietnam, the Navy F4s that didn't have guns (and usually didn't bother with gun pods) were way more successful than the Air Force (who always flew with gun pods and eventually added an internal cannon to their planes). The issue was that they both (Navy and Airforce) initially only trained against other F4s, instead of against planes that were comparable to what they faced over Vietnam. The Navy setup schools to retrain their pilots to not drop speed to try and line up gun runs, and trained against other US planes that were more comparable to the Russian planes. Eventually the airforce adopted similar training regimes.