PRISM [1] didn't end when the media stopped reporting on it. If anything it's likely only become more emboldened given people's tepid response. This [2] is one of my favorite documents that was leaked. It's a user manual, "User's Guide For PRISM Skype Collection", for NSA agents spying on Skype "peer to peer" connections in real time.
It even includes a helpful FAQ like agents wondering why they might receive copies of the same message multiple times. What happens there is when somebody they're spying on logs in via another device, their resync process involves everything being sent right on over directly, automatically, and in real time to the NSA again. They can even spy on video/audio in real time, with some promises to agents frustrated about audio falling out of sync with video - that they were working on a technical solution.
The companies at the time participating in PRISM were Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and others. That's undoubtedly been long since expanded.
PRISM is a good example of the difference between America and India. One, there's vocal and empowered opposition, opposition granted relief by the courts from time to time. Two, there was opposition–MUSCULAR involved hacking Google and Yahoo's clouds. Three, there is a warrant process. It's broken. It needs reform. But it exists.
What empowered opposition or successes? Many seem to have confused the highly publicized 'telephone metadata collection is unconstitutional' ruling with PRISM. That was related to other domestic spying bills - section 215 of the Patriot Act and its subsequent renewal under another spying act, the "USA Freedom Act." These cases/acts had nothing to do with PRISM.
Numerous cases have been filed against the NSA in regards to PRISM, with nothing even remotely close to success. They are invariably thrown out because the NSA acting illegally or unconstitutionally can only be challenged by somebody with standing. You only have standing if you can prove you have been surveilled and affected because of such. Nobody can prove standing, so it's impossible to legally challenge a likely illegal program. Great system we have.
A reminder that whatever else we might want to say about the comparative safeguards of the US and Indian "lawful intercept" systems, access to Indian servers for the US IC is fully automatic. You can't improve your resilience against the NSA by offshoring your data; offshore is where the NSA's authority is at its zenith.
No where in the parent's comment did they mention the US. What's the point of your comment?
It's like if we were discussing a serial killer and you were like "don't you think other people have killed?"
The second reply to this post and someone is already redirecting the conversation to a country not mention in the story. Are you upset because you think India is being singled out? No where on the article or the comment does it imply that.
On HN there are a massive amount of discussion about US government spying already, it's not something that people aren't aware of.
The parent comment is valid. The GP comment specially highlighted the Indian networks as different so that factoid being challenged (in efficacy rather than implementation) is a pretty valid stance.
Yes. There is almost certainly access. But it’s partial and adversarial, not automatic as in India.