[woodruffw]

My (outsider's) understanding is that the "longtermist" sub-school of EA has grown over the years, and has developed increasingly convoluted and speculative rationales for behavior that would otherwise be considered unethical.

The example I'm most familiar with is calculating utils in terms of the expected total human population of the galaxy, were we to achieve interstellar travel: it's not inconceivable that orders of magnitude more humans would be alive in the distant future than are alive now, which makes their combined future interest more important than the interests of any (or even all) living human beings. Consequently, we should divert money away from the welfare of people living today and towards efforts that maximize the likelihood of a galaxy filled with colonized planets.

If that sounds ridiculous, it's because it is.

[javajosh]

Galactic utility is ridiculous. But so is the other extreme, to act only on short-term utility. The asymmetry is that most humans don't need any encouragement to think short-term, but they do need some impetus to think long-term. But it takes wisdom to balance the two concerns. And yes it is a huge downside to any strategy that delays gratification that it can be "hacked" for evil, which is a problem more general than EA or "longetermism".

[woodruffw]

Assuming utilitarian ethics for a moment, I agree!

Maybe someone more familiar with the EA movement can answer this: why has rule utilitarianism disappeared from EA rationales for behavior? That seems to me a very natural check on these otherwise extreme (long and short-term) leaps of reasoning.

[hither_shores]

I don't know about "EA rationales", but rule utilitarianism is unpopular among philosophers largely because it's believed to collapse into act utilitarianism. The phil101 caricature is that rule utilitarianism says "no stealing, because 'no stealing' is a rule that increases utility" and act utilitarianism says "steal if you think it maximizes utility" - but on the one hand "no stealing, except for bread to feed your starving child" is an even better rule, and so on; and on the other hand not incorporating uncertainty into your decision procedure isn't being a good act utilitarian, it's just being an idiot. And so in practice they endorse the same decision procedures in pursuit of the same end.

[7e]

This is called “the end justifies the means” and EA did not invent it, unfortunately.

[woodruffw]

Honestly, I think this is even more perverse than the "normal" hedonic trap of the ends justifying the means: this particular branch of EA expects us to make world-altering decisions based on what mostly comes off as speculative science fiction.

I would understand it more if it was purely hedonic: at least I could then argue about whether the ends actually do justify the means! But instead it's this sort of unfalsifiable, "but what if" reasoning that's actively diverting money away from worthwhile causes.

[ETH_start]

That phrase refers to doing immoral acts and justifying it by the supposedly positive impact of that act in the long run. It does not refer to acting in the long term future's interest instead of the short term future's.

[bagels]

I know you're not defending this take, but I'm having trouble seeing how scam coins benefit future people.

[woodruffw]

My understanding is that the EA argument for cryptocurrency boils down obtaining the means to do the most good: they want to do the most good, and that requires financial resources. This allows them to justify just about any financial activity, so long as they can convince themselves that the long term utility of their behavior outweighs its downsides. Which gets us cryptocurrencies and oil company investments.

[hither_shores]

> Consequently, we should divert money away from the welfare of people living today and towards efforts that maximize the likelihood of a galaxy filled with colonized planets. If that sounds ridiculous, it's because it is.

It sounds ridiculous to you because you framed it in an uncharitable way. Another way of saying "maximize the likelihood of a galaxy filled with colonized planets", so far as contemporary people are concerned, is "minimize the likelihood of civilizational collapse". Even a marginal reduction in the risk of nuclear war, for instance, would be a very good thing.

[woodruffw]

> Even a marginal reduction in the risk of nuclear war, for instance, would be a very good thing.

Nobody disagrees with this. But since you brought it up, I think it's worth asking: what precisely has the EA movement done to reduce, even marginally, the risk of a nuclear war?

[etcet]

I believe the general consensus is that nuclear war is a great risk and important to prevent but the effectiveness of philanthropic efforts is low. Fighting malaria is still a more effective form of altruism.

https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/cause-areas/long-term-future...

https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/nuclear-security/

https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/carl-robichaud-fa...

[hither_shores]

> what precisely has the EA movement done to reduce, even marginally, the risk of a nuclear war?

Nothing that I'm aware of. In general I think that most of the current "longtermist" organizations are useless - but that doesn't mean they're incorrect.

[woodruffw]

Here’s how I think about it: they aren't necessarily incorrect, but they are behaving in a misleading manner by labeling speculative ethical behavior as “EA” when it’s neither effective nor particularly altruistic (in the sense that Singer uses).

I don’t belong to the EA movement, so maybe it just isn’t my place to say what should or shouldn’t be EA. But this kind of bootstrapping of classroom ethical dilemmas into actually diverting donated money away from human welfare efforts astounds me.

[hither_shores]

> misleading manner by labeling speculative ethical behavior as “EA” when it’s neither effective

I agree that they're ineffective, but I don't see any evidence that the MIRI types are lying - they're trying to help, they think they're helping ... and they're mostly wrong. It happens.

> But this kind of bootstrapping of classroom ethical dilemmas into actually diverting donated money away from human welfare efforts astounds me.

Are you sure that's what's actually going on? Donations and especially effort are not fungible. The techy libertarian futurist types in the MIRI orbit, for instance, are so far as I can tell simply not as bothered by poverty as Singer et al. A world in which they're not worried about AI risk is not a world in which they give just as much to other causes; it's a world in which they give less.

[bagels]

How does giving your money to crypto businesses improve the future?

[hither_shores]

When did I say it did?

[etrautmann]

parent was sarcastic

[moomin]

Guarantee you that the same people espousing this use Net Present Value to evaluate their investments.

[ETH_start]

>>If that sounds ridiculous, it's because it is.

Based on how you described it, I don't see what's ridiculous about it.

[maxbond]

It is utter hubris to put the lives of fictional future people, mere characters in a story you've invented, over the lives of real people alive today.

It can justify virtually any action. The future is unknowable, so we can spin a new yarn every time we want to justify a new ethical compromise.

[ETH_start]

In principle, a greater number of future lives matter more than a lesser number of present lives. The principle itself seems sound to me.

The problem is you can't actually be certain those future lives will come to exist. One assuming they will, and being so confident in their assumption that they deprioritize the lives of the currently living based on it, is hubris, but only because it over-estimates one's powers of prognostication.

[maxbond]

If we agree the principle can't be applied - why would we consider it sound? That's like saying the principle behind 1 + 1 = 3 is sound, with the small caveat that you get the wrong answers. If something looks good on paper and turns sour when we try to use it, that's the indication that we've miscalculated.

Another perspective to consider; the best way to help people in the future is to help people today. Solving the challenges of our time is an investment that will compound into the distant future. Speculating on what life could be like in a hundred or a thousand years, and tailoring your efforts to that imagined future, is much like creating a product without a customer in mind. If you end up with something useful, it's almost certainly on accident and not because your speculation was accurate.

[ETH_start]

A principle can be sound while not being applicable. Principles and applications are two separate things and there's no reason to conflate them.

>>That's like saying the principle behind 1 + 1 = 3

That's not sound in principle..

>>Another perspective to consider; the best way to help people in the future is to help people today.

That is an entirely valid, and I would argue probably correct, perspective yet it doesn't invalidate the principle that a greater number of future lives matter more than a fewer number of current lives. It may be that the best course of action for both future lives and current lives is to pursue the best interest of the currently living.