[jdiff]

Yeah, it's possible for a web server to detect and change the returned data maliciously. Even with user agent and all other factors changed to match, it's possible to detect even the difference between being piped into another command vs being redirected to a file.

[rosnd]

It's also possible for a web server to selectively serve you a backdoored .deb or git repo

[electromech]

It helps that Signal uses an HTTPS apt repo and includes "signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/signal-desktop-keyring.gpg" in the apt list entry. If their download server were compromised, (and assuming the hacker didn't also get the private gpg key) the attacker would have to provide malicious archives selectively to avoid detection. Anyone who installed the old key (e.g., me) would notice the key validation errors.

[drran]

So what? I can inspect downloaded code and find the backdoor, or a trojan, or an error. I did it few times already in last 30 years. If you cannot do that doesn't mean that nobody can. But I cannot do that with `curl | bash`.

[rosnd]

If you can't save the output of curl into a file, you certainly aren't one of the few people capable of meaningfully inspecting anything you download.

[drran]

I cam do that on MY machine. I cannot do that on your. I can download code, inspect it, install, and then create a RPM package, which can be installed in a safe way by DNF package manager, but I cannot do that with `curl | bash` method of installation.

[rosnd]

>I can download code, inspect it, install, and then create a RPM package, which can be installed in a safe way by DNF package manager, but I cannot do that with `curl | bash` method of installation.

But you can?