| > Than TOTP? Yes, absolutely. Recovering lost TOTP keys in a secure way is a difficult problem, and this happens all the time when people get new phones. With SMS the code is tied to your account, not the device. > Than email? Probably not much better than email for most users, but I guarantee for a large subset of users the SMS experience is better. With email you need to go to a separate app/page on the same device, with SMS you get a notification on a separate device or a notification popup on the same device (that usually lets you easily copy the code). Again, I totally agree that SMS has issues, but people arguing against it should spend some time in a usability lab with non-tech people - the kind of issues they hit will blow your mind. > The problem with SMS is that it adds additional vulnerabilities through sim jacking. Then fix the SIM-jacking problem. Which, I'll note, phone companies have made a lot of improvements in making this harder, and in the US government has gotten involved in making this harder. Most importantly, note that SIM-jacking is really just a "how do we verify someone who lost a device" problem. That exact same problem exists with TOTP and hardware keys. All we really need are uniform guidelines for proving identity when a device is lost so you're not at the mercy of some low-paid, outsourced service rep to keep your account secure in the face of a persuasive bad guy. |
You can store your backup codes in any number of ways. The easiest being to just download them and have them automatically backed up to Google Photos/ iCloud.
> Again, I totally agree that SMS has issues, but people arguing against it should spend some time in a usability lab with non-tech people - the kind of issues they hit will blow your mind.
I don't really care about usability when the solution is strictly worse than doing nothing. Like, to be clear, users would be safer without SMS if they just used a unique password. SMS is a terrible solution that really only solves "you used the same password across two sites, one of those sites got popped, the attacker doesn't have access to the common tooling to phish your SMS, and you can't figure out how to use email apparently".
> Then fix the SIM-jacking problem.
It's a lot harder to fix "make SIM recovery safe" than it is to fix "make email recovery safe" because phone numbers transfer all the time and emails rarely do. Further, almost all account recovery ends up falling back to email natively, so there's no additional attacks added.
At the end of the day:
1. Every modern browser supports a synchronized password manager, which makes all non-FIDO2 MFA basically useless
2. SMS 2FA adds additional attack surface through SIM jacking
3. Every modern phone is a FIDO2 compatible token
SMS 2FA is simply a technology that has no place. Attacker tooling has already started to adapt to non-FIDO2 MFA so the time for that approach is just over, the best thing we can do is stop pushing for adding new vulnerabilities just to fail to solve a problem that has trivial solutions.
In short, it adds nothing over other techniques and it strictly increases attack surface.