[londons_explore]

> two-sided negotiations of crypto algorithms

This is a common problem, and massively increases attack surface, since if a vulnerability can be found in any algorithm, it can be exploited. Downgrade attacks are a varient of the same.

Let me present an alternative:

Each protocol has one specific encryption algorithm and set of parameters. However, that set isn't fixed, but defined based on the current date and time.

For example, HTTPS could be defined as "SHA1 from 1996 till 2006", "SHA256 from 2005 till 2018", "SHA3 from 2017 till 2032", etc.

The dates can be written 10+ years into the future, so that software deployed today is still usable that many years into the future. As soon as the last date period expires, the software is not usable until it has been upgraded (unless both ends of the communication link choose to fake the date).

There is precedent for software 'expiring' - that happens whenever the root certificate of a trust store reaches an expiry date.

The downside is sometimes an algorithm might be broken before its date comes, and other times an algorithm may still be secure at that date. But that still seems better than our current mess of downgrade attacks.

[GTP]

As you say, it could be that an algorithm gets broken before its "expiry date" or remains secure well past that (look e.g. at AES). There is a similar but better alternative, usually called "opnionated cryptography". A protocol specifies a single cryptographic primitive for each type needed (hash function, block cipher etc) so no negotiation is needed. If one of the primitives gets broken, a new version of the protocol is released that uses a different primitive.

[kevincox]

It seems to me that it may be better in many cases to support exactly two configurations (or some other small fixed number). This way there is no need to wait until a new version is released and dropping the vulnerable one won't cause any downtime. Ideally both codepaths would be regularly exercised (maybe clients should pick randomly when both choices are available). Then as soon as a vulnerability is discovered (maybe even before it is publicly revealed) all clients and servers could immediately drop support for the one that was discovered vulnerable.

Then the release of a new configuration can be done slowly with reasonable caution to get back to the desired redundancy level.

[remram]

And then you still have a roll-out period during which those two protocols are available, so the two parties still need to negotiate which version they want. It's not clear to me what the advantage over the current situation is?

[GTP]

>the two parties still need to negotiate which version they want

Not necessarily. If the client contacts the server using version X, the server will reply with version X.

[remram]

What if the server doesn't support version X? Then the client will try again with version X-1. This is a negotiation, it is just an inefficient one (client might have to try X-1, X-2, X-3 in turn if more versions are still co-existing; and contrarily, if client doesn't support any version the server does, you will not get a detailed error about the version mismatch, because they are entirely different protocols).

[GTP]

>Then the client will try again with version X-1

Who says that? Either it is specified in the protocol, and then you're right that this is still a negotiation, or it is not specified in the protocol, so if the client does that is implementing some out of spec behavior. Which is true that already happened on the Internet for compatibility's sake, but keep in mind that there is still an advantage, as an adversary can't easily mess in the connection setup phase in a way that protocol version X looks like protocol version Y.

[remram]

If you don't have this downgrade, then clients can't talk with servers that haven't been upgraded yet! This means either that:

* you expect all servers to upgrade immediately, or at least faster than clients, or

* you delay upgrading clients you know to be insecure until servers had time to upgrade, or

* you are ok with breaking a significant portion of the network for every protocol update.

Either way, your proposal makes no sense for the internet.

Additionally, this is already possible with the current negotiation scheme. You can have clients refuse old algorithms (and they do). Your proposal doesn't improve anything there or anywhere else.

[bhawks]

That's sounds a lot like protocol negotiation, just implicit vs explicit and limited to 2 algos.