[derefr]

The version in the Golang stdlib defaults to a pure-go implementation... unless you're compiling for amd64, in which case you get an assembler variant apparently directly derived from the XKCP package (https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/master/sha3/keccakf_am...).

Slightly concerning news for the (mostly-Golang-based) Ethereum ecosystem, which relies on SHA3-256 for pretty much everything...

[tptacek]

Easy enough to test, right?

    func main() { 
      h := sha3.New224()
      buf := make([]byte, 4294967295)
      h.Write(buf)
      sum := h.Sum(nil)
      fmt.Printf("%x\n", sum)
    }

Doesn't crash on my amd64 dev machine.

Later

I could have just looked at the code, too: the assembly you've linked to is just the Keccak permutation, not the entire Go hash; the buffer management is done in Go, not in assembly.

[derefr]

This is one of those cases where I'm actually more concerned that it doesn't crash. It's like seeing clearly-syntactically-invalid code that somehow compiles anyway — you wonder what semantics the compiler could have possibly ascribed to it.

Presumably this isn't not-crashing just because the developers of the Golang stdlib somehow found+fixed this bug back in 2015 when this assembler file was baked. The error is in that assembler code, I'm sure. It's presumably getting masked by something. (Something that may be benign, or might be subtly corrupting the runtime.)

For a benign case: maybe the Golang runtime isn't allocating you precisely as many bytes as you're asking for, but rather a little bit more? Perhaps rounding up to a multiple of a page for more-than-page-sized allocations?

Not having access to an amd64 machine at the moment, I'll have to ask you: does increasing the size by one, as in the article, cause an infinite loop?

[tptacek]

No, it causes the string

    c5bcc3bc73b5ef45e91d2d7c70b64f196fac08eee4e4acf6e6571ebe

No matter what Go is allocating under the hood, it has to be feeding exactly that many bytes to the SHA3 algorithm.

[derefr]

> it has to be feeding exactly that many bytes to the SHA3 algorithm

Well, yes, but this is supposed to be a buffer overflow — the algorithm itself is reading and/or writing past the end of the buffer it's been handed. My hypothesis was that Golang is allocating in such a way that reading/writing a single byte past the received slice bounds won't result in a protection fault in the way you'd expect if the allocation were exact.

[halffullbrain]

The buffer overflow is in the C version of the algorithm (and likely related to loop condition checks idiomatic to C's for-loops). The Go version is a fresh implementation, not a wrapping of the C version. I'm no Go programmer, but if I'm not mistaken, the Go implementation just eats little slices of the input buffer until no more buffer is left, leaving all the overflow-danger to the Go array implementation:

https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/642fcc37f5043eadb2509c...

Possibly not as fast as C, but easier to reason about, I'd say.

[tptacek]

Just for what it's worth, we're talking about the amd64 assembly version of the SHA3 code in the x/crypto/sha3 library; I didn't look carefully at how it's called, so if it's used incrementally the way this Go code shows, then yeah, it's fine regardless.

A second later

Oh, wait, yeah, this is just the Keccak permutation in assembly, not the entire hash. That was dumb of me. Yeah, this code looks ok?

[retrocat]

Are you sure this is the same code that triggers the vulnerability? Is the double `update` in the post itself unimportant (i.e., first updating with a 1-byte string, then the 4,294,967,295-byte string)? As I don't think this does that.

[tptacek]

Let's try! Gimme a sec. And: to be clear: I make no representation that this code proves anything, and people should of course take a hard look at the SHA3 amd64 assembly code. I'm just having a message board discussion.

One sec and I'll get you an answer to your thing about the extra write.

[tptacek]

With the extra write:

    c5bcc3bc73b5ef45e91d2d7c70b64f196fac08eee4e4acf6e6571ebe

With the extra write and an extra byte on the big write (to try to trigger the loop condition):

    ec66be1ebccf055f839fccf2d12e641dcbbda4f5c71a3bdee6509495

[tinglymintyfrsh]

Off-by-one error. Didn't do the 1 byte update.

[tptacek]

See downthread, but I don't think it matters. I didn't look at the code before writing the test case; the code here is just the SHA3 transform, not the buffer management code around it, which AFAIK is just Go code. I don't see an opportunity for the overflow here?

[bugfix-66]

I read the code carefully, both yesterday and today, and it's correct.

Read it yourself here:

https://cs.opensource.google/go/x/crypto/+/refs/tags/v0.1.0:...

There's obviously no problem.

[bugfix-66]

All the Go code is safe. No bugs.