[ReadEvalPost]

The article's thesis is that EA's moral realism stance (which finds it's apotheosis in utilitarian moral calculus) is ill-supported and highly questionable, especially when combined with theological anti-realism.

It's definitely not written to win over any EA supporter, that's for sure.

[ineptech]

Is EA predicated on moral realism? That seems like a straw man. I don't see any contradiction between abandoning realism (i.e. admitting that there is no objective way to measure goodness or other moral qualities) and EA.

We probably just define EA differently. When I'm elected dictator, it'll be illegal to write an essay like this without supplying your working definition of the thing you're against.

[telotortium]

In my view, EA generally means "taking utilitarian ethics ('the greatest good for the greatest number (of humans, or perhaps of other lifeforms)', with (premature) death as the worst outcome) literally and seriously in philanthropic work, usually to the exclusion of other philanthropic goals (aesthetic, religious, etc.)". Perhaps there is a form of EA that isn't at its core utilitarian, but then it's just reduced to technocratism and seems unlikely to inspire the almost religious devotion that EA current does.

[ineptech]

Religious devotion? No offense, but that sounds like more straw. I think there's an awful lot of people who read about EA, visit some charity ranking websites, rethink their giving, and then don't go on to start a blog.

I don't think EA is utilitarian. Or at least, not in any way that requires objective moral realism. EA doesn't say, "moral goodness is quantifiable and I can prove on graph paper that one life saved from malaria is equivalent to 137 meals delivered to hungry people." It says, "I don't know what goodness is or how to measure it, but I need some way to decide where to donate, so..."

In other words, EA demands that you actually think about where your money goes and whether that's the best place for it, rather than just donating to whichever charity has the most emotionally moving imagery and music in its TV commercials. Once you do that, it naturally follows that almost any system you use will give the same answer: "Sheesh, I should probably donate less to the animal shelter." And I think 99% of the hate EA gets is rooted from the fact that people like donating to their local animal shelter, but can't really justify it.

[schoen]

EA was definitely founded by reasonably orthodox utilitarian philosophers, like Peter Singer, Peter Unger, Toby Ord, and William MacAskill.

Formal EA organizations and conferences also have a lot of utilitarians heavily involved.

So I think it's fair to say that EA is rooted in utilitarianism, although those same utilitarians might say, for utilitarian reasons, that it's a good thing when people think carefully -- or at all! -- about how to be more effective and have a higher impact, regardless of what metaethical views (if any) those people subscribe to.

[ineptech]

I mean, fair, but does it follow that someone who dislikes utilitarianism or feels it's disprovable must consequently dislike EA? Because that seems to be the thesis of this essay.

I guess it comes down to this: when people argue with utilitarianism, in my experience it's specifically the part about treating strangers and friends equally, i.e. the idea that it might be better to save two drowning strangers than to save one drowning friend. I don't think EA relies on that or is based on it; you can have a value system that says it's better to save your drowning friend than to save ten or a hundred drowning strangers, and still find EA valuable.

[dale_glass]

If you dispense with realism, why couldn't you embrace the animal shelter?

Just bite the bullet. Say, "I've grown disenchanted with people, they suck. I'm going to dedicate myself to improve the lives of animals instead, who are mostly blameless victims of humanity, and are much cheaper to make happy than a human".

Utilitarianism doesn't really tell you how many dogs is a human worth, so you well can decide that you value dogs very highly, and that's all that's needed to make donating to an animal shelter very rational.

[ineptech]

That's the thing, I think you can. If everyone who donates to animal shelters felt as confident about it as you described, I don't think anyone would have a problem with EA. Certainly, no one is complaining about the idea of, between two charities who do the same thing, giving to the one who does it more effectively.

But there's a lot of complaining about the idea of comparing two different kinds of altruism. And the whole point of EA, I think, is that the fact that it's uncomfortable leads people not to do it at all, and prodding them to think about it feels like an attack.

[robertlagrant]

> but can't really justify it.

That assumes a tie-breaking morality that says objectively that animal shelters aren't a good enough cause. If that's your mindset, then no wonder people who donate to animal shelters don't like you talking about EA : - )

[darawk]

I think a more useful definition would be about instruments, not ends. It is up to each individual to define their utility function. If they want that utility function to be aesthetic or religious, that's up to them. EA as a philosophy doesn't determine what your utility function ought to be.

What it does say is: conditional on selecting a utility function, you should attempt to use the tools of rationality, statistics, etc to maximize it efficiently. The fact that particular groups of EAs have sufficiently similar utility functions to pool resources in determining how to maximize them does not mean that all EAs must agree on those utility functions.

If your utility function says the greatest good is converting non-believers to flat earthism, then EA says you ought to study how best to achieve that before devoting lots of resources blindly. It doesn't tell you that flat earthism is bad.

[astrange]

I think I've seen Mr. ACX say that this is wrong and the right way to do it is to be utilitarian, but just don't try very hard to calculate it ie don't be rational or maximize it.

This is probably correct; if you maximize anything hard enough you'll end up in a logic trap, turn the world into paperclips, and get eaten by a utility monster[0]. That's because rationality doesn't actually work in the real world[1]. Of course, "just don't try hard" isn't going to work for everyone.

I think if you do try to rationalize "utilitarianism but not calculating too hard", you end up at virtue ethics, but ironically I haven't thought about that hard enough to say.

[0] ie you can increase happiness temporarily by giving everyone drugs, they'll just die after

[1] https://metarationality.com, also see Taleb on why you shouldn't always "maximize"

[mst]

A reasonable short (so necessarily lossy) version of what I've ended up believing is:

- policy decisions should be made on a consequentialist basis (which can involve utiliarianism like calculations but is to me most about considering second and third order consequences, with attempts at calculation as merely one mechanism through which to do so)

- personal decisions should be made on a virtue ethics basis

I'm not going to claim this as a Right Answer but this model has proven to be the least wrong / most useful one I've encountered in practice, at least for me.

[telotortium]

IMO that's a very reasonable approach with two caveats:

- Consequentialism has real issues with ethics in the very large to infinite scale (time, numbers of people, etc.). Most theories of ethics have issues in this limit as well, but Macaskill accepts the repugnant conclusion and advocates for "longtermism", which I think is undeveloped in anything more than a vague "we should think about the future" sense.

- It's perfectly valid for a human society to decide to have some non-consequentialist bright lines they won't cross.

[dale_glass]

Why what way, and what do you understand by "virtue ethics"? It doesn't seem to be a very common approach, so I'm not very familiar with it.

[Psyonic]

So Thanos was an effective altruist?

[dale_glass]

Movie Thanos' plan is to kill half the universe to solve the resource problem. This seems obviously stupid to me, since the world population can double in about no time at all, and will create a huge incentive for growth. Imagine half of the housing in the world being empty. Great time to start a new family!

Comic book Thanos wants to kill half the universe to woo Death, as in the female deity representing death. No altruism in that as far as I can tell, just the world's most brutal romantic gesture.

[darawk]

I don't know enough about the Marvel (or whichever) universe to answer that question.

[tunesmith]

EA adherents can use rigorous reasoning to reach different conclusions, just from having different values that they start with. Case in point: One person might want to maximize quality of current lives; another might want to maximize quality of future lives. Reasoning validly from there, they can reach wildly different conclusions on how to most effectively give.

[JamesBarney]

I don't think you need strict utilitarianism.

I think you just need to believe two believe the following to be mostly an effective altruist.

1. Helping two people is better than helping one

2. Helping one person a lot is better than helping another person a little.

[hither_shores]

> realism (i.e. admitting that there is no objective way to measure goodness or other moral qualities)

Moral realism is the position that mind-independent moral facts exist; it doesn't entail any particular belief about how or whether we can come to know them.

[cedilla]

Who is this written for then? It seems to me that the author just builds up a few explicit strawmen and expects that the reader is already on board with the idea that they are obviously idotic.

[archon1410]

It's not really against EA then, it's against all morality and ethics as such. Rightly title the article "Against trying to be a decent person" and it's obvious why it's a piece of junk.