[rmind]

So far the most plausible theory is that Russia sabotaged the pipelines for two reasons [1]: 1) to claim force majeure and avoid massive penalties Gazprom would have to pay for the breach of contract (we are talking billions here; now they just blame the West and good luck proving in courts who actually did it); 2) to further blackmail and coerce the European nations (particularly Germany and Italy) who depend on Russian gas to stop supporting Ukraine.

As for explosions, they were recorded by the seismologist in Sweden and Denmark who are quite convinced it was due to a deliberate action: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-gas-baltic-pipelines-leaks/32...

[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/09/29/russian-s...

[cpursley]

Your theory just doesn't check out. With the pipelines destroyed, Russia can't blackmail the EU with energy as easily as they could before. And why would they destroy infrastructure that they poured billions into when they could have just turned off the taps any time they pleased?

The pipelines now being destroyed is a really bad thing for Russia, a worse thing for the EU and a great situation for the USA (and Poland, who just opened a pipeline). Both Biden and Nuland have both publicly threatened to take out the pipelines. Ukraine has also lobbied hard against them.

I mean, it very well could be the Russians. They certainly have the capability - but I'm struggling to see the logic behind cutting off their dealmaking hand.

[yreg]

Russians have kind of the same possible motivation as everyone.

To take the option of some future DE/RU agreement regarding restoring the flow of gas off the table. To force everyone to fully commit to their current strategy.

[MichaelCollins]

> To force everyone to fully commit to their current strategy.

I agree the destruction of the pipeline does have this effect, but Russia seemingly wants NATO support for Ukraine to falter, not persist. Russia seems to want NATO to deviate from their current strategy.

[dividedbyzero]

Russia also wants the EU and especially Germany to deviate from their current "no dependency on Russian gas ever again" strategy, at least in the mid- to long term. Those pipelines could have sat there until needed.

[yreg]

The motivation to commit to strategy applies to one's own country / one's allies.

Putin might want to make sure no one pressures him to reopen the pipeline.

German leaders might want to make sure no one pressures them to reopen the pipeline.

Etc.

I'm not claiming that this was the actual motivation for the attack, of course.

[room606]

It's called burning bridges. Both domestically and internationally. It signals that Russia is committed to seeing the war through regardless of what the West does and it consolidates power domestically by discouraging any potential conspirators from acting against Putin since destroying the pipelines makes it virtually impossible for any replacement to resume delivery of gas to Europe

[valuearb]

Ludicrous.

Putin wants Europe to cave this winter and use the leverage of turning these pipelines back on to get them to stop suppporting Ukraine.

[sokoloff]

Could Putin-opposers in Russia potentially benefit by removing a series of future moves from the Russian government?

[rmind]

Because they would have to pay billions for not delivering the gas due to the breach of contracts. Legally, you cannot turn off the taps just because.

Moreover, Russia can still supply very significant quantities of gas via Belarus and Ukraine, so they retain the leverage to blackmail the EU.

[cpursley]

This just doesn't make sense. The pipeline's current and future value was worth more than any breach of contract. It's really just basic math and grade school logic.

Somebody didn't want Germany making a deal with Russia after the reality of winter sets in.

[rmind]

Doesn't it? [1][2] suggest that Germany paid $25bn for fossil fuels to Russia in 2021, where a large portion of this must be gas. The cost of building Nord Stream 2 was less than €10bn and some of that was probably covered by Germans. So, it might cost something similar to one year supply. Keep in mind that gas contacts are often long-term.

Also, you assume the pipelines are irreparable, but we don't know that.

[1] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-ge... [2] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/how-dependent-is-ger...

[sudden_dystopia]

Legally, you can’t just invade another country but that didn’t stop Russia and it has never stopped the US. Do you think Russia is going to care about the legality of debts they owe to a system that is sanctioning them? What more can we penalize them with if they don’t pay, nukes? They are literally removing themselves from the system the west has set up and are creating a new one with other BRIC nations to try to compete.

[rmind]

Russia won't but the West will. If you have a clear cut case of contract breach, then it's pretty straightforward to confiscate the property via courts and so on. The sanctions, on the other hand, are more complex, they might involve freezes (even if permanent, it's not confiscation), have different extent, not all countries subscribe to them, etc. The world is complex.

[valuearb]

The west can't confiscate anything within Russia, and has already confiscated most of their foriegn currency assets.

The world isn't that complex. Putin needs these pipelines, they offer leverage when Europe runs low on gas.

[MichaelCollins]

> [1]: 1) to claim force majeure and avoid massive penalties Gazprom would have to pay for the breach of contract (now they just blame the West and good luck proving in courts who actually did it);

This doesn't make much sense to me. Even if we assume the premise that they have such a motivation and can't.. simply refuse to pay fines.. there are easier ways for them to destroy their ability to deliver gas without causing such expensive damage. For instance, they could claim more of their turbines failed. Then when the war is over and they want to sell more gas, the repairs would be a lot cheaper.

[rmind]

I think they calculated that the Nord Stream projects are pretty much dead in the current circumstances. It was a political project to start with.

Also, I think it is a statement to EU: your underwater infrastructure is not safe.

[MichaelCollins]

> Also, I think it is a statement to EU: your underwater infrastructure is not safe.

I don't buy this "blow up our pipeline to implicitly threaten others" narrative at all, for the simple reason that all the involved countries knew Russia had this capability already. If it was meant as a demonstration, it would be a demonstration of madness, not technical ability.

[Ekaros]

False flag bombing attack at some part of terminal would seem much more reasonable. And lot cheaper and simpler to sort out.

[IAmGraydon]

>to further blackmail and coerce the European nations (particularly Germany and Italy) who depend on Russian gas to stop supporting Ukraine.

How? This has literally removed their ability to blackmail Europe, as it's not even an option anymore.

[rmind]

As I wrote in the post above, they still retain the levarage through the Druzhba [1] and Yamal [2] pipelines (passing via Belarus and Ukraine). These combined have a MUCH greater capacity than Nord Stream 1.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Druzhba_pipeline [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yamal%E2%80%93Europe_pipeline