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No, this explanation is not correct. These pensions were generally not trying to juice yield by buying gilts with leverage (they would not be able to borrow cheaply enough to make this work, and leverage would be better used to buy stocks). The margin calls are coming from interest rate swaps they did to mitigate accounting risk on their long term liabilities. When rates fall, pensions take huge paper losses because the present value of liabilities moves inversely with interest rates. To hedge this risk, you enter into a swap with a bank to essentially pay current floating interest rates (in return for receiving a fixed rate). This swap's value moves in the opposite direction of the liabilities. Unfortunately because rates moved up so quickly, these swap trades are deep in the red. Even so, the funds should not be going bankrupt from these trades, because the losses net against enormous accounting gains from their liabilities being worth less. Anyway, this is a complicated and technical story about the interaction between bond math, accounting, and liquidity risk. There is a lot to criticize, but the moralizing version of 'greedy pension fund managers borrowed to juice yields' is not quite accurate, and Matt Levine's article is a good source (although he doesn't get into the nitty gritty of interest rate swaps). |
This kind of swap wasn't just about protecting against the downside (otherwise they could've bought an option), it was about doing it as cheaply as possible by selling off the upside. They took on extra liabilities in order to pay as little as possible for their protection - or, equivalently, to boost their returns - and they missed, or failed to properly cover, an edge case in the liability they were taking on.
You can certainly make a case that it's well and good for pension providers to try to make as large a return as possible. But the "greed" shoe fits.