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by pgorczak
1372 days ago
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The process makes sense from a separation of powers perspective. When there’s an especially fine line between what legislative wants and (constitutional) judicative allows, there has to be some rejections. This is probably one of the cases where lawmakers feel some spite about constitutional courts exerting too much influence over their work. It would be easier if they’d just talk about it before going through the whole process but I guess creating frustration is part of the point here. |
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1. The plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," meaning that the injury is of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent 2. There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct brought before the court 3. It must be likely, rather than speculative, that a favorable decision by the court will redress the injury
Talking in advance about what law is constitutional would be perverse under such system (I love the standing doctrine, btw and so does the Chief Justice).