[dirtyid]

>Zeihan's books

General digression on Zeihan: His books are... fine for pop geopoltics. Zeihan "thought" is also an ecosystem of books / lectures / newsletters / videos where his predictions are crafted to appease his differnt paying audiences based on rudimentary geopolitic prognosis (geography+demography is not new framework) and superficial arguments and sometimes just bad data. Strafor trained him to be a good salesman. His US stronk, PRC weak arguments has been largely uncritically parroted by PRC collapsists, an ever trending topic due to ongoing Sino-US competition. Zeihan makes a lot of predictions (with mediocre hit rate)... about many countries, more from perspective of geopolitical potential frequently divorced from actual political realities. Apart from US domestic politics, he's not a particularly deep subject matter expert in other countries, including PRC, but many none the less latch onto onto his napkin analysis and combine it with other superficial PRC collapse / doomed talking points. Ultimately it's pop geopolitics, like there's a reason he hasn't given talks at any prominent PRC focused think tanks or policy circles where at least 10+ years ago, he's (well Strafor) was memed as more marketting than useful analysis.

>navigable river

Both are blessed. Major rivers and taming them is what made Chinese empire. Zeihan's thesis around PRC rivers is focused on history of flooding of farmland heavy Yellow river in north, concentration of industry around more easily navigtable Yangtze/Pearl rivers in south. How north/south divide historically caused political /regional power arrangments that are easy to fracture (China broke again meme), and historically massive disasters when river misbehaves. Notes CCP undertakes massive infra/water works/transfer projects to stitch everything together (pre CCP historically as well). His basic TLDR is China has to spend massive resources to bribe provinces to unified and China has been fractured longer than it has been unified historically (false), and spending all this money on infra projects = PRC will stay capital poor (lol), and it's also why PRC buys (bought) so much superior US tbills, implying USD is keeping PRC political unity afloat. This is message sold to US exceptionalist/China collapsist. Meanwhile PRC capital accumuluation has increased massively while reserves have shrunk to historic lows (2T at time his writing 2008, 4T peak 2013, now 1T).

In comparison, what does he say about US waterways, oh it's great, links up with farm land and coasts, protected by elements because geography, links strait to gulf/east coast. I think he literally used the word "perfect", don't need any extra infra or management, why even have a highway system, but we built one anyway because US so rich, #1 etc etc. Nevermind US corp engineers also historically conducted massive infra/water management projects, and inability to build/sustain "extra infra" in decades after to present makes these waterways severely underutilized / never properly exploited. Nor that US states have vastly different Federal funding/dependency... almost as if US Gov has to bribe states to keep country cohesive. Meanwhile PRC state/infra capacity actually exploiting waterways thoroughly, controlling previously massively catastrophic flooding that previously killed MILLIONS, now hundreds (which Zeihan has tweeted about as if it's omen of coming collapse). Zeihan magnifies US potential vs PRC risks.

In terms of water, PRC via Tibet headwaters has some of the greatest hydro resources in the world but PRC is water stressed (1.4B population does that), but central gov doing massive water transfer (north/south) to alleviate. There's plenty of articles about US water crisis as well. Hard to say long term, but PRC ag hasn't been particuarly impacted but this is where politics > geography, with caveate that PRC population decline will trend towards less pressure / managable crisis over time.

>ports/diversification

PRC isn't particularly export dependant (currently ~20% vs peak of 30%+ vs US 14%), export heavy / dependant is like 30-40+%. As for demographics, PRC automation installation of industrial robots last few years is larger than US/JP/SKR/GER + around the next 14 countries combined. For cheap labour, PRC companies diversified lowend/light industry to region first to emesh them into PRC supply chains via companies controlled by PRC. The TLDR is PRC is strategically outsourcing some stuff (low end labour, high pollution sectors) to make region more dependant (cooperative model), while all signs point it maintaining manufacturing domestically for internal market. In terms of resources, everyone has lots of raw global inputs to defend. Ergo PRC rapidly building up navy (most ships right now while US hulls projected to decline). I argue they can defend against anyone except USN out in open waters, while aquiring capabilities to deter Sino-US war (likely over TW) in meantime. Meanwhile, PRC has near monopoly on various rare earth processing that will take decades for others to reshore.

>fracking ... >didn't mention this is the context of war with China.

Not in books as far as I know. But he's rationalized fracking/energy security in remarks/interviews over PRC at mercy of US blockade because US now energy secure talking points, which now prevalently informs the ever popular PRC is vunerable to blockade narrative. As for US withdraw / serve as offshore balancer, US can do that, but all developments in recent years have shown that PRC is exception to US FP indifference and US will be involved directly in PRC containment. The broader point is he believes energy self reliance + fortress America gives US almost impervious position of strength. But we are approaching point in history where US geography is no longer impregnable shield anymore. See recent US conniptions over PRC (global) hypersonic developement. PRC would of course be happy if US withdraws, but US energy security may/will be just as vunerable as PRC if there's confrontation.

>demographics

All this is true, but in context of great power competition between US/PRC, societies can manage different demographic pressures/patterns while relative gap in comprehensive power can still narrow/shift. Average PRC citizen can have a much shittier QoL vs US, but workforce and industrial policies can still be organized to be systemically competitive, if not more so. PRC can shrink to 1B people, with gen pop stuck in miserable East Asian work culture with poor safety net (though keep in mind PRC has highest savings/homeownership rate and relatively less reliance on welfare state), while still grow military to multiple times current size and move up value chain to increasingly threaten US primacy because there's still easy catchup growth and demographic divident in terms of disproportionate STEM talent vs past workforce that was mostly low skilled. PRC soon keeping hands full (for much longer than 10 years) doesn't mean PRC comprehensive power have peaked or PRC will undergo decline, or according to Zeihan, collapse.

>navy,competition

I don't see where the competition is TBH, plenty of resources to go around for short/medium term and little appetite for war (except PRC/US over TW). As for PRC navy, it's doing more deployments abroad, but doesn't have any foreign security commitments. Like there's no reason to war with India, it's border skirmishes were fought with stone and sticks. Neither country interested in ruining "Asian Century". Japan only if they support US in TW scenario. Senkaku/SCS disputes not worth military/navy, relegated to "domestic" matter for coast guard. But yeah the Chinese navy will be used to do navy things for PRC security interests.

> recall Zeihan talking much about the U.S. going to war with China

No he's pretty firm offshore balancer, America can influence abroad at home while most world collapses without US order advocate. Surrounding PRC with missiles is talking point commonly associated with malacca blockade talk. But US bipartisian anti-PRC FP looks to be doubling down on interdicting directly in TW, because loss of TW risks collapse of US East Asian security architecture. Zeihan thinks PRC will collapse so why bother.

> pessimistic

For the audience his writing caters to (US exceptionalist), his pitch is (IMO) disguised pessimism - having rolled natural 20s on geography US has to work hard to fail, vs US competitors has to work hard to succeed (but here are surface analysis of why they won't). Like credit to him he does acknowledge US failings / challenges because the politics in US geopolitics has been underperforming, but he tends to trivialize US challenges with "at least our adversaries are doomed".