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by coffee--
1382 days ago
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Here's my pitch: The worst revocations are mass ones that the site operator didn't request. ARI gives a heads-up to renew early, maybe because all certificates issued using HTTP-01 are getting revoked in two days. Revocations aren't always about distrusting a specific certificate. There's likely nothing wrong with the certificate, but it needs replacement for ecosystem cleanliness. Regardless, 40M certs are being revoked in a 10 minute window on Saturday (oof, because that's the covenant with the BRs, not because Saturday is somehow not awful!). Reissuing 40M certs may take a dozen hours (1000/sec), even if all clients work optimally and begin immediately after OCSP changes status. During that dozen hours, those certs are all already revoked. It'd be nice if clients could be told in advance: replace this certificate right away, regardless of its validity period. Get it done early before the crowd forms and replacement requires queuing up. (Obviously using multiple CAs mitigates the downsides to waiting until revocation) |
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So yes, if we're being strict like the policy is, an early renewal signal is a red flag that a certificate can't be trusted. There might not be anything wrong with it, but we can no longer be sure.
I mean, there's also nothing wrong with a certificate 2 seconds after it expires. Probably. But we can't be sure. And because of that, we immediately distrust the certificate when it expires. (There might be something wrong with it before it expires too. But that's less likely because less time has passed, so we allow it, I guess.)
I think the vision is nice. I really do. I just think the clients that need it most won't support it.