[ericmay]

Wars happen because each of the two sides think they can win.

In this case, the US is obviously confident it can win. This one is easy to see in this scenario.

China on the other hand questions the commitment of the US: “really, you’re going to go to war to protect Taiwan? It’s China! What do you care?”, and this could be true if geographic and geopolitical realities were different.

But what the CCP somewhat and I think many Chinese citizens misunderstand is that Taiwan isn’t just some island. Taiwan is a crucial linchpin to all of America’s presence and legitimacy in Asia.

So for China (more so Chinese citizens) it’s just some island that belongs to China anyway. Of course China would win and take over because Americans don’t really want to fight or think they can win right?

There lies the miscalculation that leads to the war. It’s not about Taiwan the island, it’s about existential foreign policy for America. The US is extremely determined to maintain the status quo. China misunderstands this and thinks that an invasion over Taiwan won’t lead to an actual war because they don’t understand what the war is about.

Note: When I say China, I mean people who question whether the U.S. is determined to fight a war over Taiwan. Certainly main Chinese including leadership in the CCP understand what’s at stake, which is why they haven’t undertaken an invasion as of yet.

[barelysapient]

The US doesn't think they can "win" in the sense that someone 'wins' chess or checkers.

What the US can do however, it make the conquest of Taiwan very expensive. Sort of what they're doing in the Ukraine but probably with a shade more direct involvement. China will experience a abrupt cutoff from the US lead international order in addition to some limited skirmishes with western forces. But they also won't be physically prevented by western forces from occupying Taiwan. Western arms and intel will help fuel the Taiwan government until it's defeated. The goal isn't to win. It's simply to make the invasion very expensive.

Now, what I think western leaders are missing in this calculus is that China will not stop at Taiwan. The expense of exclusion from the western system is already priced in. It'll be paid for with additional expansion. So, after a short rest, China will ramp up with the annexation of additional territory within and around the nine dash-line setting up further conflicts with those countries. Taiwan's violent subjugation will give those countries pause and likely result in some combination of territorial concessions or vassalization; similar to the recent integration of the Solomon Islands into China's new extra-national order.

In parallel, Russia will solidify their holdings in western and southern Ukraine. I think at some point they'll test European and Nato resolve with a handful of attacks / incursions. But don't expect Nato to invade Ukraine or Russia anytime soon, because, you know, nukes. Ultimately, I predict Russia will move to finish their conquest of Georgia or accept their capitulation. Armenia will welcome Russian forces and Russia will begin moving further south into the middle east where they'll support Iran in conflict with some of the wealthy but poorly defended Arab states in the late 2020's or early 2030's.

[ericmay]

I'd agree that describing this potential conflict as "win" or "lose" oversimplifies the engagement. But I would definitely disagree here:

> But they also won't be physically prevented by western forces from occupying Taiwan. Western arms and intel will help fuel the Taiwan government until it's defeated.

I'm a little perplexed because you seem to understand what's at stake, but you don't think the US would fight? All evidence points to the contrary. I mean not only is the US military present, the actual stakes are existential physical and economic security. If you aren't going to fight for those stakes I don't know what you do.

> In parallel, Russia will solidify their holdings in western and southern Ukraine.

I think this remains to be seen. I'm curious about how well Ukraine will do under current operations. It's bewildering to me that Ukraine can just strike and blow up Russian targets with impunity, including in Belgorod which presumably had some sort of air defense capabilities. I don't think Russia wants a fight with NATO unless the goal is to make defeat easier to swallow, because engagement with NATO necessitates a nuclear response from Russia due to what would clearly appear to be a decisive victory for NATO based on Russian performance in Ukraine and I'm not sure Russia wants to use nuclear weapons either. Engagement with NATO seems to be a lose/lose.

[barelysapient]

> I'm a little perplexed because you seem to understand what's at stake, but you don't think the US would fight? All evidence points to the contrary. I mean not only is the US military present, the actual stakes are existential physical and economic security. If you aren't going to fight for those stakes I don't know what you do.

The US is talking the talk but won't walk the walk. There remains virtually no political will to fight other peoples battles. This is why politicians from both major parties have argued for leaving NATO. Americans are tired of endless wars and the prospect of another is unbearable. Moreover, a protracted war with China will bring the sort of economic discomfort to the american populace not experienced since world war 2. American's don't have the will for it.

> I think this remains to be seen. I'm curious about how well Ukraine will do under current operations. It's bewildering to me that Ukraine can just strike and blow up Russian targets with impunity, including in Belgorod which presumably had some sort of air defense capabilities. I don't think Russia wants a fight with NATO unless the goal is to make defeat easier to swallow, because engagement with NATO necessitates a nuclear response from Russia due to what would clearly appear to be a decisive victory for NATO based on Russian performance in Ukraine and I'm not sure Russia wants to use nuclear weapons either. Engagement with NATO seems to be a lose/lose.

Russia's war strategy is very different from the west. Where the west see's troop and equipment loses as a negative, Russia views them as a mixed bag. Sure, it sucks to loose hardware but armed peasants will fight harder with the clarity of what loosing means. It's the pattern that won them world war 2 and brought them success in Chechnya.

Now more strategically think about it this way: Russia has no worries about loosing territory in the current conflict with Ukraine. Even if tomorrow they, say, provoke a Nato member by invading it... Nato will respond only to push Russian forces from their territory. Nato will not use nukes fist. And Nato lacks the political will to invade Russia or impose regime change. Since that's the case, Russia can really do whatever they want. Russia's warning to the west remains. Touch our land and we'll nuke you. And given no credible counter to this threat, Western powers will remain very wary of provoking a 'miss-calculation' that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

The same rational exists in Taiwan. So, if China invades Taiwan, Western forces might have a few exchanges with them, but do you really see American boots-on-the-ground fighting and killing hundreds-of-thousands or millions of Chinese troops? When would American troops arrive even? After China starts the war? Because that's what it will take to 'win' for Taiwan. Okay, maybe you think American would do that. That's just defense. Can you imagine American troops landing in China for the purpose of threat neutralization? It'll never happen. Since the west won't violate China's borders China is also secure.

Territorial security is a partial basis of external belligerence. This is the lesson America has been teaching the world for the last 70 years.

[ericmay]

> The US is talking the talk but won't walk the walk. There remains virtually no political will to fight other peoples battles. This is why politicians from both major parties have argued for leaving NATO. Americans are tired of endless wars and the prospect of another is unbearable.

I'm not sure this issue over Taiwan, certainly at the State level, is viewed as other people's battles. I think this issue is viewed squarely as what it is, which is global supremacy. And to your point about both parties arguing for leaving NATO, that tends to occur on both the far right and far left, but you see in practice massive support (99-1 kind of votes in the Senate which are unheard of) to support Ukraine even at the risk of escalation and in spite of the energy issues. Gas in the Great Lakes region was pushing over $5.00/gallon and not a single thing changed w.r.t US support for Ukraine. Europe is far more likely to bow out than the US here. But insomuch as both parties may have people who are arguing to leave NATO (which, no surprise is primarily due to Russian disinformation campaigns), virtually nobody is arguing to leave Taiwan to China. You can see continued US + ally action that runs contrary here. I don't believe that there is any evidence to suggest that at least the political leadership and State apparatus of the United States has anything in mind but maintaining dominance.

> Moreover, a protracted war with China will bring the sort of economic discomfort to the american populace not experienced since world war 2. American's don't have the will for it.

I agree that this is a risk, but the US is in a far better position here than China. While Americans may have a hard time obtaining iPhones, Chinese would have a hard time importing food or energy, especially as the US completely cuts off all shipping into the mainland. You're also guessing that this would be a protracted war, when that may not be the case. I'll dig it up if you are interested but the RAND Corporation did a pretty good study about the likely trajectory of the war and surmised that both sides would be incentivized to make the war as brutal and destructive for the other side as possible to get them to capitulate early, but that runs the risk of redoubling efforts to win the war versus capitulation. That is to say, it's possible (perhaps likely) that in the outbreak of a war we eventually wind up in a protracted conflict, but we may also wind up in a position where one side completely dominates the other and the war is short and intense. The scary thing here would be a long and intense war which I believe is most likely unless the US wins decisively and early.

> Russia's war strategy is very different from the west. Where the west see's troop and equipment loses as a negative, Russia views them as a mixed bag. Sure, it sucks to loose hardware but armed peasants will fight harder with the clarity of what loosing means. It's the pattern that won them world war 2 and brought them success in Chechnya.

I agree that Russia views this very differently than the west and it's why so many were surprised by Russia launching the invasion. They'd say things like "but why don't they just stop and sell things and coexist peacefully?" which is to misunderstand what the aim of Russia is here. However, that being said Russia's strategy, as you argue, of just losing troops until they win only works to the extent that they don't lose too much military equipment. This isn't the Red Army. You can also see this in the lack of Russia actually fully engaging in the war in terms of conscription, calling it a "special military operation", etc. Putin rightly fears that public opinion would turn against him and the war should Moscow and St. Petersburg and other more ethnically White Russian areas start to feel the effects in terms of a draft or something like that. So the point there is that Russia does have a limit on what it is willing to lose. Putin is in a tough spot as well here and so far has been unable or unwilling to commit fully to the war.

> Now more strategically think about it this way: Russia has no worries about loosing territory in the current conflict with Ukraine. Even if tomorrow they, say, provoke a Nato member by invading it... Nato will respond only to push Russian forces from their territory. Nato will not use nukes fist. And Nato lacks the political will to invade Russia or impose regime change. Since that's the case, Russia can really do whatever they want. Russia's warning to the west remains. Touch our land and we'll nuke you. And given no credible counter to this threat, Western powers will remain very wary of provoking a 'miss-calculation' that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

I completely agree that NATO has no intention or desire to invade Russia, but Russia runs a huge risk here as well of having its bluff called. Russia can do whatever it wants to Ukraine, and Ukraine can strike Russia (as we can see with attacks in Belgorod) without nuclear retaliation. But if Russia were to attempt an invasion of a NATO country, I think Russia military assets within Russia are on-limits in a similar fashion. It's easy to see where the lines are drawn because the US is/was basically towing missiles and equipment to Ukraine and Russia neglected to strike those assets. Both sides intend to keep the war contained to Ukraine for the time being because both sides think they can win. If Russia was serious about the nuclear threats (most of which the bluffs have been called) they would have used a weapon already at the outset of the war and seized the Baltics before NATO had a chance to make sure all members were ready to go. Given Russia's apparently reluctance to truly create a nuclear disaster and they're unwillingness to engage in NATO air assets feeding intel to Ukrainian missiles, you have to wonder what's going on.

> The same rational exists in Taiwan. So, if China invades Taiwan, Western forces might have a few exchanges with them, but do you really see American boots-on-the-ground fighting and killing hundreds-of-thousands or millions of Chinese troops? When would American troops arrive even? After China starts the war? Because that's what it will take to 'win' for Taiwan. Okay, maybe you think American would do that. That's just defense. Can you imagine American troops landing in China for the purpose of threat neutralization? It'll never happen. Since the west won't violate China's borders China is also secure.

Of course you know I disagree that the same rational exists here as Ukraine isn't an existential issue as Taiwan is.

But no I don't see the US undertaking an invasion of China or anything like that because it is both impractical and unnecessary. Troops on the ground to defend Taiwan or help retake the island? Yea, absolutely, unless China engaged in a fast, decisive victory which pushed the US out of the Pacific completely and permanently. Though I think China runs some risks there because Australia and Japan at a minimum will build nuclear weapons out of fear due to the void left by US exit of the region pending the fallout from such a move. But those ships, planes, air bases, troops, etc. aren't in the Pacific just for fun. The US does intend to maintain what I'll call Taiwanese neutrality here and there's absolutely no doubt in my mind we'd be in a shooting war with China over it because the alternative is the US loses everything. Wars happen because both sides believe they can win. That's why we'll be in a war here soon unless something changes in China.

[barelysapient]

This is the sort of dialog I live for on HN. Gotta get back to work but I really respect your opinion and thanks for intellectual exercise.

Ultimately I hope for peace and kindness for us all; as I suspect you do too.

[ericmay]

You too my friend and I sincerely do. Fuck war.

[yrlihuan]

The US will win in a non-war scenario, by using its influence over the other countries and isolating China from the US's western allies. It's an easy choice and seemingly an easy win.

A real military conflict with China near China's front door is another thing. I doubt anyone with some common sense should call that an easy win.

[mschuster91]

> The US will win in a non-war scenario, by using its influence over the other countries and isolating China from the US's western allies.

The US has lost a lot of their soft power, beginning with the Iraq war, but exploding during the 45th Presidency. Their failure to convince Germany to drop North Stream 2 is the best example of that loss - particularly the gang of senators which thought it would be a good idea to threaten a harbor with sanctions [1] was perceived as extremely rude here. And a lot of nominal allies are highly skeptical of how reliable an ally the US themselves are, given the very high likelihood of the Republicans getting obstructionist power again either this November or in two years and the lack of decent candidates on the Democrat side.

[1] https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-us-senators-threaten-ger...

[ericmay]

I agree that the US lost a lot of soft power capabilities over the years, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine really reversed most of those loses in short order. What a blessing in disguise for the United States. For example, you mention that a lot of allies are highly skeptical of how reliable of an ally the US is, but you can see actually that when it came down to it the US was extremely reliable in defending Ukraine and bolstering NATO forces, and the issue of Taiwan is a linchpin of US hegemony: it's existential, there's no doubt the US will go to war to defend allies in Asia including Taiwan because failure to do so basically kicks the US out of Asia and destroys those alliances. I think this goes back to my original comment about China's (or at least many of their more hawkish citizens, less so the CCP I believe) misunderstanding about what's at stake regarding Taiwan.

Though I think your point about obstructionist Republicans is well-founded and accurate and extremely accurate when it comes to domestic policies. With that being said I don't see a significant threat there in terms of US vs Russia or US vs China given that even when their vote was mostly inconsequential (i.e. they could try and virtue signal) most members of Congress, either Republican or Democrat, tended to vote to support US efforts against Russian aggression. The Senate was voting something like 99-1 to support Ukraine (don't quote me on the exact bill or bills) when they didn't really need to and could have tried to stick it to the Democrats as war mongering and followed in Trump's footsteps there.

[mschuster91]

> And the issue of Taiwan is a linchpin of US hegemony: it's existential, there's no doubt the US will go to war to defend allies in Asia including Taiwan because failure to do so basically kicks the US out of Asia and destroys those alliances.

For now it is, the interesting question is if the US voter class is ready to go to war again after the disasters of Iraq and Afghanistan - at least from an European POV it looks like wide swaths of the population do not want further overseas engagements and wish to reduce military spending in order to have more money available to fix pressing issues (crumbling infrastructure, healthcare, poverty, high energy prices). Additionally, while Trump himself is a very vocal opponent of China and I think Taiwan will be secured even if the Republicans win either of the next elections, it is nowhere near certain that Trump as a President will apply the same towards Russia or other enemies of the Western sphere - particularly not given strong indications of both himself and his close environment being influenced by Russia, both financially and via "kompromat" rumors (e.g. the "pee tape" allegation).

[cycrutchfield]

Polling, from even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, says that a majority of Americans support defending Taiwan from Chinese aggression. After Ukraine, support is probably even higher. Even more, there is strong bipartisan support for it.

[ericmay]

I think many outside of the US misunderstand the impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Outside of political talking points and nightly news, the wars basically didn't exist. I mean if you just turned off the news, you'd have no idea that the US was fighting two wars. The military was at war, but not America. There weren't really any day-to-day effects and to the extent that there were, those are mostly long gone. I don't think that these wars have any bearing on additional US engagement, especially against China or Russia. In other words, I don't think the US is war weary at all, though I do think that out of the issues you mentioned some measure of the population doesn't think they're problems, except high energy prices which I think the US can mostly address domestically. I'd also add from a more realistic standpoint the military isn't preventing fixes for healthcare, poverty, or crumbling infrastructure. What's preventing addressing those issues is that some people don't think they are issues and those that do disagree on how to solve them.

The main threat to the US is dissolution of the democracy, but I think even in that case there would still be strong (maybe even stronger) support for defense of Taiwan because it's an existential issue for the US. For China to invade Taiwan with impunity would dissolve all American credibility in the Pacific and the ramifications of that are significant. It also would kick the US out in terms of trade in favor of China, which would do damage to the US economy.

There certainly is some concern that China may try to engage in a fast, hard engagement with the US and that could cause the US to withdraw, but given the significance of maintaining economic and military interests it's likely that it would just lead to a swift, hard response and from there we're probably in a pretty destructive war. I don't think even Trump or someone similar could prevent a US response here.

[ericmay]

Sorry - I meant that it was easy to see that the US is confident it can win, not that winning would be easy.