| The lengths to which this article goes to construct a model sympathetic to the author's views are incredible. It takes data showing a greater variance among males than females: - in mathematical ability - among schoolchildren - on a standardized test and generalizes them to: - many different types of abilities - among the Y Combinator applicant pool - on the Y Combinator application process Not only that, but by its end, the article is postulating a model in which literally one in a million people have sufficient aptitude to be accepted by Y Combinator - whether they're interested in it or not! Even if you grant the author all of those assumptions, plus the risk aversion thing, you're only down to 13% women, three times what TechCrunch says Y Combinator actually accepts. I guess you could add another independent 99.9th percentile ability requirement, but then you're talking about one in a billion people being Y Combinator worthy. Or you could try to find a different, more tilted risk aversion statistic -- but at that point I think we'd be cherry-picking citations to fit a conclusion. So, sure, if you accept a whole raft of dubious assumptions, you can explain the 4% acceptance rate by aptitude alone. But enough dubious assumptions can explain almost anything. |
Why do you feel this is unreasonable? Do you think there is some huge pool of people good enough for YC who just don't get in? Maybe the true numbers are 1 in 100,000, but I'd be surprised if they are much higher than that.
In any case, I'm not attempting to claim my assumptions are correct. The only point I'm making is that small differences in underlying probability distributions can have large effects in the composition of people accepted into a highly selective program.
I.e., Eric Ries is making the fallacy of the excluded middle: "either aptitude/preference differences are huge, or else they don't explain much." This is simply mathematically incorrect.