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by tobrien6
1410 days ago
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Experience exists. Whether the contents of the experience are "real" or "not real", it is not coherent to claim that there is truly nothing at all -- what could even cause one to come to that conclusion if there's nothing at all? Platonism is one of the few (only?) games in town in terms of potential ability to furnish answers here (a Popperian scientific method has well-defined boundaries on the scope of explanatory power) -- and the more indications we get that physics can be derived from number theory and combinatorics, the more seriously I think it will be taken as a research topic. A more formally developed Platonism would also potentially be able to address the "something rather than nothing" question. Why do you think "something rather than nothing" question doesn't make sense? |
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I adopt ontological anti-realism and do not stray into "existence" claims because they simply raise too many methodological issues. The quotes here are important because I don't have an intuitive understanding of what people mean when they say "exists" in the first place.
You could rephrase "Experience exists" as "Humans experience" or "I experience," which is analogous to Cogito in Cogito, ergo sum but without the ergo sum. There's a subject and a predicate already, and "exists" adds nothing.
If you want to make substantive claims about what does or doesn't exist, your views are subject to relatively straightforward reductio ad absurdums. This is demonstrated pretty clearly in On What There Is.
> Why do you think "something rather than nothing" question doesn't make sense?
"Something" = quantifier, "nothing" = quantifier, existential "is" = quantifier. Again, I would insist on a predicate here.