[_THE_PLAGUE]

Say I live in a set, set_1, that has some property p_1. I can think about other sets, like my own, say, set_n, with similar properties for those, say, p_n. I am confined to set_1 so I can only speculate about what goes on in the other sets, if, indeed, there be any other sets. I speculate that all these sets, s, reside in some big super-set, S, with it's own p-like property, P. But this does not have to follow. I could have an infinite series of sets s, with their own unique p properties, but a super-set to which they belong does not itself have to have its own super-p property. It might, but it might not.

This is my problem with "Simulationism". It assumes such a "super P" property for the "super-set containing all universes". This property of course is time. The entire universe could be describable by a bit-string (Tegmark, et al) but that does not mean it has to "run" on anything, any more than a super-set S of s worlds each with property p has to have its own "super-property" P. I think it is a common misconception but not easy to clear up for people who don't have a technical background.