[vikR0001]

Let's say you need to get a field back that is already in the database table, but that wasn't previously returned by the GraphQL endpoint. All you have to do on the front end is ask for it and GraphQL will populate it for you on the server.

[dragon-hn]

If your GraphQL schema is just a mapping of database tables, in my experience you are in for a world of hurt in the future.

[crispyalmond]

At my workplace they made this decision before I started and I can fully agree with this. It's essentially a typed REST without any of the benefits. No joins, everything is multiple calls away to perform a "full" query.

I don't even want to think about undoing this mess.

[vidarh]

It's possible to do this without it getting painful, but you need to annotate the database schema with a lot of meta data.

We don't use GraphQL, but we do use an API that is mostly generated from meta data about the schema and permissions on a per field basis, with the ability to override on a per table basis.

To the API consumer it's invisible if they're referring to something that refers directly to a real database columns or to a method on a model class that doesn't correspond directly to the database (e.g. the user "password" attribute is

Effectively there are two schemas: the API schema and the database schema, it's just that the API schema is "prepopulated" from introspecting the database schema using Sequel (Ruby ORM), with the model classes translating between the two, with a synthesised default mapping.

The "API schema" includes more granular type information suitable for the frontend, and permissions, including type information returned to the frontend to provide default client side form rendering and validations (also enforced on the server, of course). It also auto-generates documentation pages with example data, inspired by Airtable's doc pages.

But key to avoiding what you describe is that these are all easily overridable defaults, and the permissions default to allowing no columns, so while the db schema introspection makes it quick to expose things where a direct mapping makes sense, it also makes it easy to avoid.

Unlike GraphQL we explicitly avoided allowing you to request arbitrary complex sets of data, but what you can do is expose queries by defining model metadata for them that either wraps suitable views or custom queries. We have a UI to allow us to define and store custom queries and views for e.g. reporting needs, so we can prototype new API needs in the browser writing just queries with some metadata annotation.

It gets us the flexibility of being able to quickly return exactly the desired data, while retaining control over the queries and complexity.

[sholladay]

A world where the front end can access any database field it wants sounds like a security / privacy nightmare to me.

Of course there are ways to prevent data from being returned but that’s fragile.

[netik]

This isn’t remotely a problem. Field by field granular security is trivial to implement in GraohQL

[hamandcheese]

I have to disagree with you there. It is possible, but it causes other annoying problems.

For example, field-level security pretty much means every field could be null at any time. Depending on your graphql server implementation, this might cause an entire request to fail rather than just that field to be omitted, unless you change your schema to where everything is nullable.

Checking every field can also easily lead to performance issues, because it’s not uncommon for a large, complex graphql request to have hundreds or thousands of fields (particularly when displaying lists of data to a user).

[withinboredom]

Not to mention GraphQL wasn’t designed with security and user-state in mind. It was an afterthought that was bolted on, varying from framework implementation to implementation.

[jfengel]

How the heck was that not on their minds from day 1? It's the most obvious question to ask about a project like that.

[withinboredom]

It’s from before the https-everywhere days, or around the same time letsencrypt was started up, IIRC. Back then, I feel like security wasn’t as big of an issue, at least for less sensitive things. Like literally the entire site would be http until you got to checkout and the only reason you had the certs was to be PCI compliant.

[necovek]

GraphQL is mostly concerned with the query semantics.

A proper solution to security/privacy issues should have sensitive data never reach the outermost GraphQL layer.

So the problem is with the existing tooling that enables GraphQL implementations, but like anything else, if that tooling is deficient, the entire approach is on the shaky ground too.

[dragon-hn]

> unless you change your schema to where everything is nullable

At my current job, this was done before I was involved. It isn’t a deal breaker, but it throws away one of the best features of GraphQL.

In the end you just have every client implement the rules that should have been in an API tier (if they are competent), or worse no validation that gets you a giant mess.

[purerandomness]

How does GraphQL help here?

[BerislavLopac]

Assuming the backend actually supports mapping of that particular field.

[_3u10]

For external users of the API this can be quite helpful when you’re looking for the password column on the users table.

For some reason I don’t think graphql actually works this way. Can’t quite put my finger on why allowing access to any column on a table might be a really bad idea.

[HelloNurse]

Putting passwords in a database, and that database behind some kind of service that allows queries, is a stupid mistake that can be implemented with SOAP, CORBA, a remote shell, or any other protocol or API style.

I don't think GraphQL makes the problem worse except by encouraging experimentation by putting an unusually powerful query language in the hands of the users

[jonhohle]

Ancestors of your post are suggesting exposing entire DB schemas (I would assume mechanically). While that could also be the case in other protocols, typical an IDL is used to separately define the API layer. Of course it’s completely possible to generate a WSDL, etc. from a DB schema, in practice I’ve never seen it done.

[HelloNurse]

My point is that passwords shouldn't be stored in the "normal" database where some clever architect might expose entire DB schemas to external access.

If clever architects manage to expose the carefully segregated database of the small and secure authentication module, they cannot claim it was an accident or someone else's fault,

[charcircuit]

>Can’t quite put my finger on why allowing access to any column on a table might be a really bad idea.

Privacy

[ahepp]

Why not just query the database directly then?