[mannykannot]

The argument you make here is a reasonable one (IMHO) for the plausibility in principle of what Searle calls “strong AI”, but he claims that his “Chinese Room” argument proves that it must be mistaken. One can simply ignore him, but to refute him takes a little more effort.

It turns out that when one looks at the argument in detail, and in particular at Searle’s responses to various objections (such as the Systems and Virtual Mind replies), it is clear that he is essentially begging the question, and his ultimate argument, “a model is not the thing modeled”, is a non-sequitur.

[TheOtherHobbes]

The argument is essentially that there are no qualia of Chinese comprehension in an automaton or in any system that uses an equivalent algorithm, whether or not run by a human.

It's a sound argument to the extent that qualia clearly exist, but no one has any idea what they are, and even less of an idea how to (dis)prove that they exist in external entities.

It's the materialists who are begging the question, because their approach to qualia is "Well obviously qualia are something that just happens and so what?"

Unfortunately arguments based on "Well obviously..." have a habit of being embarrassingly unscientific.

And besides - written language skills are a poor indicator of human sentience. Human sentience relies at least much on empathy; emotional reading of body language, expression, and linguistic subtexts; shared introspection; awareness of social relationships and behavioural codes; contextual cues from the physical and social environment which define and illuminate relationships; and all kinds of other skills which humans perform effortlessly and machines... don't.

Turing Tests and game AI are fundamentally a nerd's view of human intelligence and interaction. They're so impoverished they're not remotely plausible.

So as long as DALL-E has no obvious qualia, it cannot be described as sentient. It has no introspection and no emotional responses, no subjective internal state (as opposed to mechanical objective state), and no way to communicate that state even if it existed.

And it also has no clue about 3D geometry. It doesn't know what a sphere, only what sphere-like shading looks like. Generally it knows the texture of everything and the geometry of nothing.

Essentially it's a style transfer engine connected to an image search system which performs keyword searches and smushes them together - a nice enough thing, but still light years from AGI, never mind sentience.

[mannykannot]

Searle’s argument is not about qualia; it is (as Searle himself has repeatedly stressed) about syntax, semantics and understanding. The argument simply does not consider what the room’s occupant feels.

Even if it were about qualia, calling the argument sound “to the extent that” we don’t know enough to tell whether its premises are correct would be a misuse of ‘sound’ and a rather blatant case of burden-shifting - effectively saying “so prove me wrong!” to skeptics.

Materialists can and do make question-begging claims, but that does not somehow cancel out Searle’s own question-begging (furthermore, somewhat ironically, Searle describes himself as a materialist!)

The soundness of the argument cannot be established by showing that current technology is far from being strong AI, as the argument claims much more than just that - it claims it to be impossible in principle. Anyone making such a claim has assumed a heavy burden that demands stronger arguments than you are making here.

[salawat]

>A model is not the thing modeled is a non-sequitur.

Have you ever used a map?

If not, I'd like you to get one and I want you to point out your home in every one. Can you use a magnifying glass, then look at the map hard enough to see yourself looking over a tinier map? Ad infinitum?

That is what Searle means. A map is a model of the world. The model of a world that is a map is not, in fact, in any way equivalent to or interchangeable with the thing it models. It is merely a distilled representation that provides a facsimile representative enough to be useful. So to would be any attempt at modeling consciousness.

[mannykannot]

This is an argument from the general to the specific which does not apply in this particular case, nor in many others like it. As a mind is plausibly an information process ocurring within the body, this generalization does not rule out an informational model of the physical processes of that body producing a mind.

If the argument you present here could be so easily generalized, it would work just as well for “proving” that a computer model of an Enigma cypher machine cannot encipher text.