[amalcon]

You probably use a consequentialist meta-ethical framework. This is great -- I do too -- but in a deontological or virtue-based system it may or may not work out this way. We've already got an example of such a deontological system here: if one takes the (somewhat unusual but not unheard of) view that legality implies morality, then there's a moral difference because there's a legal difference.

The trolley problem is meant precisely to highlight these differences, and I think it's one of the best arguments for consequentialism. In my less charitable moments, I like to refer to the concept of privileging inaction as an informal fallacy. It's not really, though; it's just that folks have different philosophical starting points.

[bashmelek]

Then again there are also deontological aka categorical morality frameworks that see pulling the lever as acceptable, that it is not “killing” but the life of the man in the other line is lost as a secondary effect, which must be gravely considered. There are yet other versions of the trolley problem that have you push a man in the way of the trolley to stop it and save the five. Sometimes people pose that variant as though it must be accepted as morally equivalent, but I find the importance lies in why we find the situation different.

[vintermann]

In the deontological view, both pulling the lever and inaction may be perfectly permissible.

Consider: Who knows what happens? It's perfectly possible the problem description lied, and the opposite thing happens. Either way real life doesn't come with problem descriptions. Since "what happens" is profoundly inaccessible, the more important question is what you wanted and why.

So, it's permissible to redirect the train away from one and towards many, if directing it away from the one was what you wanted. It's equally permissible to redirect the train away from the many and towards the one, if directing it away from the many was what you wanted. It's easy to imagine a world where you got what you wanted, but the bad thing that looked like would happen as a side effect didn't happen. Maybe that's the one we live in.

However, if you really wanted a specific person on the track to die, then you should pull it away from them. Not for their sake, but for yours. What happens is still uncertain, but the important thing is that you did not act on this bad desire.

(By the way, virtue ethics is just a stupid "third way" branding exercise. To say goodness isn't derived from outcomes is fine. To say it is, is at least a coherent position. But thinking you can dodge that problem by talking about "virtues" instead is just nonsense.)

[amalcon]

That's correct, in deontological or virtue-based systems it varies a lot from system to system.