| Apple chose not-jail and not-ban when faced with the requirement that all iCloud users in China be subject to realtime CCP surveillance. Apple's iCloud operations in China (required under Chinese law for Chinese users) are in CCP-controlled datacenters. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-ce... Then they did it again in the USA, preserving a backdoor in the end-to-end crypto of iMessage for the FBI: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... If you are large enough, the laws don't apply to the government's strong-arm treatment of you. They have all the machine guns, you have none. Presumably Apple de facto does not have the right to widely publish surveillance-resistant end to end crypto without state retribution for same, even on home turf with ostensible 1A rights. This is why they are deploying clientside spyware to scan your local files for CP (or anything else they are forced to scan for in the future by a adversary-controlled DoJ or DHS (hello 2025)). The secure architecture of the iPhone and iPad make it impossible to alter or disable this functionality even on your own device. The power dynamic is the same in all large countries, regardless of political structure. You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows. |
Related: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter