[simondw]

Panpsychism doesn't claim that everything has complex sensory perception, higher reasoning, memory, etc. The hard problem isn't about any of those things, which indeed have clear neuronal correlates and can easily be turned off.

The idea is that there's always "something that it's like to be X", where X can equally be a conscious human, an anesthetized human, a dead human, or an electron.

[protonfish]

Can this be measured? Does panpsychism predict a difference in worlds that have this property versus those that don't? I don't think it does, but maybe I'm missing something. If it's impervious to empirical evidence then I don't think it has sufficient rigor to be considered a viable hypothesis.

[simondw]

Great question. Most people would probably say no, panpsychism is unfalsifiable.

On the other hand, brains certainly do seem to function like qualia detectors (as evidenced by everyone talking about qualia). So, who knows, maybe there's something further to be explored there; maybe it's related to the combination problem (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Combination_proble...).

[superb-owl]

You're correct, as far as we know, the hypothesis of panpsychism is unfalsifiable.

The idea that this makes it unviable is called Logical Positivism. Personally, I think Logical Positivism is short-sighted and uncomfortable with ambiguity. But that's more of an aesthetic preference than a scientific assertion.

[marginalia_nu]

Can any solution to this problem have a measurable solution? The problem domain is the experience of subjectivity itself.