[jaeming]

I don't quite follow the moral here. Was the Dev who rolled their own auth back when MD5 was the norm supposed to time travel forward to a time when cloud services like Auth and Cognito existed? Or does the fault lie with whoever replaced his auth with cloud services and forgot to drop the passwords table?

Most of the security nightmares I've heard of result from laziness or lack of care or someone not seeing a job through to the end. All of the encryption alogos we use will be easily brute-forced at some point in the future. Is it worse to store and back up those hashed passwords locally, rather than trusting Okta to do it for you (which incidentally was breached while your old MD5 hashes probably weren't)?

[tootie]

Auth providers have existed for a long time. And the point is that when you pay a vendor who does nothing but auth, they will be able to mitigate all the changes in the industry and (if you put it in your contract) be liable for damages from a breach. The also have up to date controls in place for protecting user data and likely go through external auditing. Give our org's limited resources we don't have audit trails on a lot of things and the reality that any number of past employees could have exfiltrated data and we'd have absolutely no way of knowing. Okta had a small breach which they disclosed that didn't seem to leak passwords, and if they did I'm sure they have controls in place to expire anything that may have been compromised. Hashing passwords is easy. Mitigating an attack is really, really, really hard.

[jaeming]

Mitigating an attack is really, really, really hard.

How hard is it? What are the challenges? Could you be more specific? Cause I keep seeing the blog and article headlines telling me how hard Auth is but a lot of them don't go into details. That's the kind of mystification I'm having an issue with.

I'm not against using service providers for CAPTCHA or CDN's like Cloudfront for DDOS/brute-force prevention. Refusing users the ability to register an account with breached credentials sounds like a great idea though I've implemented something like this myself already.

I'd wager that aside from what anyone put in their contracts with OKTA, that they didn't pay out a dime for the 25 minute Breach.

Do I want to just pass the buck for the sake of saying, I'm not personally liable or being able to deflect and say, "look this happened to a lot of other companies too". That's part of the fear that these blog posts and articles try to instill with absolutes of "never ever do this..." or "this is way too hard for you..."

I'd argue I'm less of an attack vector than Okta for most of my use-cases. And I think that's part of the issue here, that a lot of us are talking different scenarios and perspectives. If I was an IT head or sysadmin, yeah, I'd probably use something like Okta or onelogin. For a web app with an admin panel for a restaurant taking reservations, Yeah, I'd roll my own and own the users table with passwords as well. For an enterprise-level web app, I might consider compromising and use something like AWS Cognito. But for all my own personal projects, a few paid contractor jobs, and even a few large-scale apps, I have rolled my own auth and preferred it largely to alternative like firebase, and auth0. I'm starting to get the picture that I'm in the minority there. If you don't care about auth and don't want the liability, sure go with a provider. I did mention in my original comment that maybe I was weird in that I liked going down the rabbit hole on auth concerns.