[commandar]

How do you figure? The same basic hardware is remanifesting as the Kindle Fire, so that's not where RIM screwed up.

When I talked to non-tech types about the Playbook, one of the common themes was "it's a Blackberry without email? That's stupid."

I mean, to the average consumer Blackberry is largely synonymous with email and BBM. What made the move particularly bizaro is that RIM tried to sell this anti-feature as a corporate security thing... for a device whose primary appeal was to end consumers.

Either way, it was a stupid waste of the Blackberry brand.

[cavalcade]

From RIM's marketing and positioning, Playbook was a companion device for the Blackberry and aimed squarely at the iPad. So in that POV, the playbook was for the people who already had email and bbm.

I think the high developer friction (poor tools, poor stores, etc.) and the wrong direction were among the bigger problems.

[commandar]

>So in that POV, the playbook was for the people who already had email and bbm.

I don't know a single person that uses a tablet that doesn't use it for email.

>I think the high developer friction (poor tools, poor stores, etc.) and the wrong direction were among the bigger problems.

You're looking at it from a technical perspective, and the Playbook's failure was a complete lack of demand from consumers. When the people that actually buy tablets react to your marketing strategy with "that's stupid" and in turn refuse to buy your device, it doesn't matter if you have the best developer tools in the world; you've still set yourself up for failure.

[cavalcade]

>So in that POV, the playbook was for the people who already had email and bbm.

>I don't know a single person that uses a tablet that doesn't use it for email.

Didn't say it CANNOT do email. webmail and email apps were welcome, and i didn't say that it wasnt a mistake (it was) but i think RIM went for an MVP (BB style email must've had a big time-to-market cost) to get to market faster.

>I think the high developer friction (poor tools, poor stores, etc.) and the wrong direction were among the bigger problems.

>You're looking at it from a technical perspective, and the Playbook's failure was a complete lack of demand from consumers. When the people that actually buy tablets react to your marketing strategy with "that's stupid" and in turn refuse to buy your device, it doesn't matter if you have the best developer tools in the world; you've still set yourself up for failure.

We are on the same page (hence the "direction") part. Playbook was a misguided attempt, instead of zagging. it wen t and battled with iPad squarely without the 10x improvement or any unfair advantage.

In summation, i think the rank of problem of RIM's tablet strategy are: 1st: Wrong angle of attack, 2nd: platform friction , (close)3rd: key features weren't in the MVP.

[lukejduncan]

Consider that the Blackberry tablets are a completely different OS than Blackberry phones. Not having email on a BB is just another example of RIM making RIM-like-decisions

[commandar]

>Consider that the Blackberry tablets are a completely different OS than Blackberry phones.

At the moment. QNX will eventually be on the phones as well, but RIM is dragging their feet about getting it there.

Another common theme from the Blackberry fanatics I know is that they're all at the very least waiting for QNX phones before they get another Blackberry, and most of them have just given up and switched to iOS or Android at this point.

It seems puzzling to me that you would count QNX against the Playbook when you take that into consideration.

[lukejduncan]

The developer experience for BB's is beyond painful. Add an unpopular device with a unique SDK and the result is fewer apps for end users