[kazinator]

That's not necessarily a reductionist argument if it respects that the consciousness has a drama of its own that is not related to the low-level parts of the substrate; i.e. that the consciousness is irreducible. The mere hypothesis that something can be ported to silicon doesn't reduce it; it respects the complexity of the abstraction itself.

Also, "the meat computer has consciousness" independently requires proof. Every meat computer thinks it has consciousness, and we just take their word for it, based on our own experience as a meat computer.

If the thing making the same claim is not a meat computer, then we don't believe it in the same way: "I know meat computers are conscious because I am one; you say you are conscious but you are not a meat computer, therefore I don't believe you".

In the same way, we could deny that an extraterrestrial life form is conscious, if it's not made of anything resembling meat.