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by cmdli
1466 days ago
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Allow me (not the author) to rephrase the argument. Lets say you have a computer that you would say is conscious. It does some computation, has some output, and you conclude that it is conscious in that moment, lets say for 1 second. Therefore, you assume that the computation (i.e. internal states and outputs) done by that computer for that 1 second creates consciousness. Extending the iron bar argument, you could have 1 second of varying internal state by the iron bar, and then create many different interpretations that interpret that internal state in many different ways. One of those interpretations will show that the iron bar transitioned through the exact same internal states as the conscious computation, and did so in a deterministic, casually linked way. What then is the different between that iron bar and the conscious computer? |
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