[no-dr-onboard]

Having worked in similar environments, I found that most of the features in this article are both believable and typical.

The workplace hostility, the various office personas, the drudgery, humiliation and bureaucracy even the VM that's triple encrypted isn't unusual for even the most benign cybersecurity researcher. Ironically, the lapse in OPSEC isn't either. Time and time again, people who are doing bad things always seem to have a lapse in OPSEC that is routinely double underlined in these types of articles.

And of course, the last typical bit is the Child Sexual Abuse Material being found. Isn't it something that when the NSA/CIA/FBI wants to take someone down they always seem to find CSAM? I'd hazard that this approach is used when the state's most "powerful and prominent police agency" isn't able to decrypt/bypass what they're truly after. Consider the frustrations they encountered with DPR[1]. another commenter quipped, "sprinkle a little CP in there and call it a day". After all, doesn't this fit the MO of the FBI/CIA when you consider the Stonewall investigations[2]? Find something that is absolutely anathema to the public, charge the suspect with that. Not surprised.

1. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/how-the-feds-too...

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stonewall_riots

[carapace]

Remember "Hacking Team"? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacking_Team

It's not mentioned in the WP article but automated planting of the aforementioned material on a target computer was one of the capabilities they sold.

[sbarbarian]

Regardless of planted or no - feel sorry for whatever digital forensic examiner had to confirm it was indeed what it was. Not the victim in this scenario, but its an often-overlooked and extremely unpleasant role to confirm this stuff.