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by masswerk
1475 days ago
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Well, I can only answer with kind of a pun. With Wittgenstein, language is a constant conversation about the extent of the world, about what is and what is not. As such, it is necessarily shared. In the tractatus we find, > 5.62 (…) For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. [1] So, something could become apparent, but you would still haven't said anything (as it's not part of that conversation). ;-) [1] https://www.masswerk.at/digital-library/catalog/wittgenstein... (I deem this edition to be somewhat appropriate in context.) |
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