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The principles guiding these specific Nato committments will likely be expressed in contemporaneous reports. Here's an NY Times archive search for Nato and Russia in the period 1996--1998: https://www.nytimes.com/search?dropmab=false&endDate=1998123... I've yet to read through those (or others elsewhere), but at the time, there was much being made of the peaceful transition of the former Soviet bloc to democratic and independent rule, including the former states of the Soviet Union, some of which remained within Russia, others, including Ukraine, which did not. There was a delicate balance of diplomacy, military concerns, economics, and internal politics in seeking a successful path forward. Committments to ease Russian concerns were all but certainly made under those considerations. The general principle of spheres of influence or concern are old and long-standing. The US Monroe Doctrine held that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas was a potentially hostile act against the United States. It was first articulated in 1823 and goverened US policy through the early 20th century. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monroe_doctrine See also the Carter Doctrine, which put a specific emphasis on oil: The notion of a sphere of influence dates to ancient times, though most typically refers to the 19th century and following. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence Put simply: a state's interests and concerns extend past its borders. That does not give unlimited licence to act beyond borders, though this has of course occurred frequently throughout history by any number of parties: Russian and its precursor state the Soviet Union, the United States, the UK and its precursor England, Germany, Japan, China, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and more. Whether acting unilaterally and without reasonable provocation or expressing interests and concerns, any major state will have such concerns, and will likely have some history of action. That said, a defensive alliance to which states seek membership on a voluntary basis without coercion from the alliance itself, and in paritcular under a credible hostile external threat, as seems to be the present case with Russia, would be hard to argue against under even the broadest of Sphere of Influence / external concerns constructions. |