Hacker News new | ask | show | jobs
by rayiner 1492 days ago
The gist of the decision is that the SEC’s imposition of civil penalties and disgorgement violated defendants’ seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Under the seventh amendment, you have a right to a jury trial for any claim that would have been an action at law in the courts of England at the time of the founding, prior to the merger of law and equity.[1] There is an additional principle that so called “public rights,” like Social Security benefits or FCC licenses, need not be adjudicated by a real court (under Article III of the Constitution) but can be adjudicated by the executive branch. The theory is that public benefits are discretionary so the executive branch can decide how to dish them out. So you end up with administrative agencies having internal adjudicating bodies that look very much like courts, but which are not in fact courts.

Ordering a party to disgorge gains from fraud is of course not a “public right” but a quintessential legal proceeding that should be brought in a real court.

There’s a lot of things administrative agencies do that probably aren’t Constitutional and violate the separation of powers. Executive branch quasi-courts adjudicating claims like fraud is the tip of the iceberg. The Supreme Court upheld these statutes in the mid-20th century under the shadow of FDR’s threat of court packing. The Reagan-era Supreme Court was not inclined to roll those decisions back, but I think you will see the current Supreme Court being much more active on that front.

[1] Law courts are the courts we usually think of, with juries. They are the only courts that can award damages. Courts of equity are like the Delaware chancery court—they can award certain equitable relief such as recission of a contract. Today most states and the federal system invest legal and equitable powers in the same courts, but the right to a jury trial arose in England when those courts were distinct.

9 comments

Very helpful. Seems like it could be a huge deal. Am curious what the impact from a caseload perspective would be? How many actions are handled on an administrative basis vs how much capacity the relevant court systems have? And impact on duration- administrative actions typically handled in x time, courts take y time. Would love pointers if anyone has them.
I think most of those cases that before were tried by administrative courts will still end up in a settlement instead of a trial. The difference is that now the process will not be blatantly favoring the executive agencies of federal government, which right now act as judges in the cases they themselves prosecute, and decide appeals from their own decisions.
You can find lists of agency actions, FCC, SEC, etc. etc. There aren’t often all that many, and they wouldn’t all fall under the category affected here.
Can defendants in criminal or civil court request a verdict from a judge or panel of judges instead of a jury?

I believe Mario Batali did that quite recently in his alleged creepy touching trial.

Back to your explanation, this seems like a court functioning the way it was meant to. I think everyone will agree there was a massive Executive overreach in the 20th century, with congress abdicating much of its counterbalancing power (making difficult/unpopular policy decisions that are future-looking is not the recipe for re-election).

Bowing to precedence regardless of the quality of the decision seems like bad law facilitating more bad law.

Yes, both civil and criminal cases can try the case to a judge, called a bench trial. Both sides have to agree to that however, since technically both sides have a right to a jury trial.
> Yes, both civil and criminal cases can try the case to a judge, called a bench trial. Both sides have to agree to that however, since technically both sides have a right to a jury trial.

The government does not have a right to a jury trial, because the government doesn't have rights. (In the federal system, for example, government consent is required for a bench trial in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but because that is not a right, and the defendants right to a speedy and public trial, there is at least one case where a federal court, when jury trials were suspended because of the pandemic, conducted a bench trial under a defense jury trial waiver despite the government refusing consent and preferring jury trial.)

Great summary, this is very fascinating. What are some of the likely impacts & effects this ruling will have over the long-term?
Some effects will be relatively small. For example the SEC has authority to haul you into court, in a proceeding which reflects how the system is supposed to work, with the executive branch prosecuting the law and the judicial branch deciding it.

But the principle invoked in this case, non-delegation doctrine, is far reaching. The non-delegation doctrine is a theory, some might say a legal fiction, that says that Congress can’t delegate its power to make the laws, but can make a broad law and allow agencies can fill in details so long as Congress gives the agencies “an intelligible principle” for doing so.

This is not without basis—there is no obvious line to be drawn between Congress’s power to make laws, and the executive branch’s power to enforce them in a discretionary manner. There is nothing wrong with Congress making a broad law “fraud shall be illegal” and the SEC making rules for itself about how to enforce that. But clearly at some point executive regulation looks more like law making and less like an agency imposing guidelines for the exercise of its own discretion.

Historically the Supreme Court has been unwilling to police that line, but that could change. One thing I think you might see is greater scrutiny of agencies applying existing authority to enter new areas of regulation. The theory might be, for example, that it’s fine for the EPA to cut sulfur particulate targets, which clearly falls under the scope of the Clean Air Act, but that the agency needs new Congressional authority to do something like impose limitations on CO2 emissions, which involves a different problem than the Clean Air Act was intended to solve. There is already precedent in this direction, under something called the Major Questions Doctrine: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12077

If you want to hear how this legal conflict directly plays out in a real case, the SCOTUS oral arguments for the recently heard West Virgina v. EPA are available via the Oyez podcast:

https://overcast.fm/+FUsKSZuBc

The most practical effect from my perspective (engineer that has to deal with regulatory permitting and compliance) is that it will hopefully act as an incentive for agencies to better cooperate with applicants, to do so in a timely manner, and to prevent permitting demands from going beyond what's explicitly required by statute.

Even where it's currently clear that administrative agencies don't have authority to deny a given permit application, they often have the ability to delay it indefinitely, or demand superfluous reqs[0] be met before approval. (Since current caselaw requires a 'final administrative decision' before being able to appeal to an Article III court, an indefinite delay is essentially a loophole for agencies to wrongly "deny" a permit while avoiding judicial review.)

Agencies will want to avoid court cases setting precedent that might broadly affect internal administrative regs/policy beyond the case at hand, and therfore the future overall autonomy of the agency. (Notwithstanding the current lawfare abuse of agencies entering consent decrees premised on feigned controversy.)

Court rulings would also better bind agencies to previous decisions, and better prevent permit revocation for arbitrary or political purposes (see Keystone XL revocation).

[0] For example, permits for natural gas pipeline compressor stations are currently only being approved if they are powered by electric motors, instead of (the traditional method) of NG turbines ("self powered" by siphoning a portion of the fuel being pumped). Even if you presume CO2 emissions fall under current EPA clean air act authority (they don't), the requirement doesn't actually reduce net CO2 emissions with respect to the project's environmental impact, since it just means a small amount of NG is consumed at a different point source, instead of further downstream.

Not only does this not reduce the overall NG consumption (and therefore not affect net CO2 produced), but it adds embedded and operating inefficiencies, as well unnecessary points of failure. (see: Texas deep freeze blackouts where some NG "backup" infrastructure failed because it required grid power to operate. Especially true in remote areas lacking any electrical infra like offshore/aggregating compressor stations.)

Here, the EPA uses permitting power to implement supralegal political policy beyond the statutory requirements, by stretching policy logic far beyond what would survive the most basic judicial review. Under the status quo, judicial review is almost always an additional cost to the applicant beyond the expensive initial permit application.

Judicial relief (or the threat thereof) that potentially pre-empts some of those bureaucratic costs would be a real game changer for both private projects and public infrastructure, in terms of both roi and time/effort to implement.

> The gist of the decision is that the SEC’s imposition of civil penalties and disgorgement violated defendants’ seventh amendment right to a jury trial

If being tried by a jury is so necessary for justice, how is it that ~95% of people currently imprisoned in this country have never faced a jury trial?

The answer is obvious - actually having jury trials for everyone would grind the country to a halt, so for the majority of us, this sort of right only exists in theory.

But you'll never hear the 5th circuit saying a word on that subject.

In a just world, this new development should mirror how jury trials work for the rest of us - anyone demanding a jury trial to avoid regulatory censure should be subjected to such horrific penalties if they lose, that nobody in their right mind would ever choose that option. Sadly, we do not live in a just world.

I don't know where you got that statistic, but regardless of how true it is, I suspect the reason so many are imprisoned without having a jury trial is that they waived that right[1] and took a plea deal.

>In a just world, this new development should mirror how jury trials work for the rest of us - anyone demanding a jury trial to avoid regulatory censure should be subjected to such horrific penalties if they lose, that nobody in their right mind would ever choose that option. Sadly, we do not live in a just world.

I'm assuming this is sarcasm because you're describing a Lovecraftian bureaucratic horror-show.

[1] I'm sidestepping the reason for why this might be so common, which likely has to do with the lack of public defenders and high caseloads though I don't have actual data that supports this.

> I don't know where you got that statistic

It's a well-known number. [1]

> but regardless of how true it is, I suspect the reason so many are imprisoned without having a jury trial is that they waived that right[1] and took a plea deal.

And why do they waive that right?

Because if they don't waive that right, they are subjected to the Lovecraftian bureaucratic horror-show[2] you pooh-poohed just a few lines down.

Take the plea deal, and serve two, or go to trial, flip a coin, and serve ten.

> I'm sidestepping the reason for why this might be so common.

You can't side-step it - you have to look at the system as a whole. It's true that most people can't ever afford to hire a competent lawyer, and it's true that going to trial with a public defender is lunacy, and it's also true that being found guilty at a trial is far, far worse than taking the guilty plea. This is by design - it's a check and balance that ensures most people don't exercise that right.

A right that for most of us only exists in theory is no right at all. It is a privilege, available for the privileged - in the sense that a feudal lord was privileged. It's justice, but only for those who can afford it. It's a complete perversion of equality under the law.

So, of course I'm mad as hell that this court ruled that the group of people most-favored by having the option for a jury trial receiving it, while we go on, and shrug our shoulders at the inaccessibility of it for the rest of us.

[1] https://innocenceproject.org/guilty-pleas-on-the-rise-crimin....

[2] Going to trial with a public defender certainly qualifies as one.

I don’t like it either that the right to jury trial is overwhelmingly bargained away, but having the right and bargaining it away is still preferable to not have any right in the first place.
Isn't the issue that in the US you only have a binary choice between jury or plea deal? I'm Canadian and here most trials are bench trials, that is in front of a judge only

https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/12.html

The reason why this is often advantageous is that the judge knows well the legal provisions and is more likely to rule in line with previous cases. The judge is also not a prosecutor (and in Canada, not elected by the public) so the judge doesn't have an incentive to be "tough on crime". AFAIK in general, you would only request a jury if you believe your case is in some way fundamentally different from similar cases and you don't want the "default" penalty if found guilty.

Yes, because this gives grounds for the argument that the system is broken (does not provide the right).

If > 90% of people are pressured into waiving the right, does the system actually provide this right?

It will be very interesting to see what happens if SCOTUS tries to roll back the administrative state, because this is how Congress wants things to work. They passed all those laws to create the agencies, after all. And the expanding administrative state is what has allowed members of Congress to do less and less actual work, and more and more performance art and fundraising. They barely even have to pass budgets any more; the agencies all find a way to keep “essential services” running anyway.

Also, personally it drives me crazy when American legal discussions fall back to English legal traditions. Didn’t we fight a big revolution so we wouldn’t have to live with all that baggage? I’m not a lawyer so I know I’m out of my depth. But as a U.S. citizen living under a written Constitution, I have a hard time understanding why my country should make itself beholden to England’s legal history specifically.

I don't see how this doesn't end with the government basically failing. The modern world is dizzyingly complex, if Congress can't delegate to dedicated agencies how does this all work.

Are there 435 people in this nation well versed enough to write detailed regulations on nitty gritty details about Securities on Monday, regulations on Agriculture on Tuesday, rules for calculating acceptable emissions for Coal Fired Power Plants based on service area, customers, and operating capacity on Wednesday and so forth.

The dismantling of the administrative state leaves us in a precarious position where we either end up completely unregulated (which I know some people would welcome, but as someone that enjoys not getting asbestos in my breakfast cereal, I think we need some regulations). Do we just end up with massive packages of regulations written up by ALEC and other private groups that then get handed to legislators and passed?

Sure an unelected bureaucrat sounds bad, but if the alternative of paying some guy $40k a year to think about these issues and draw up regulation is to let the person being regulated write their own rules, I'll take the former. I suspect the latter regulations will end up being whatever makes the most profit for the person being regulated, and if we all have to breathe lead because it makes some company's profits go up then so be it.

The government isn't always on the side of the common man, but neither are multinational corporations, and the multinational corporations are pretty up front about being in it for themselves.

> Are there 435 people in this nation well versed enough to write detailed regulations

That's part of the problem. 435 is far too low for a representative democracy. The U.S. has the highest representation ratio among OECD nations[1]. The size of Congress has been held at this arbitrary number despite the size of the country growing threefold. The value of being in Congress, or being able to influence a member of Congress is enormous. As is the competition to get into one of those 435 seats. Is it any wonder big money controls so much of politics now?

[1] https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/31/u-s-populat...

> 435 is far too low for a representative democracy.

Imagine a world in which the Congressional Apportionment Amendment had been ratified in 1789. The House would have more than 6,000 members today. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Apportionment_Am...

If it had been ratified in 1789, the "mathematical discrepancy" would have appeared between 8 and 10 million citizens. We're well past that now, and could ratify it if the states wanted to screw over Congress.[a] It wouldn't even need to be reintroduced, as submitted amendments don't "expire".[b]

[a]: Twelve states already signed on, just need a few dozen more

[b]: Case in point, the 27th Amendment[0] was submitted to the states for ratification at the same time (1789), but never had enough states sign on until 1991.

[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-seventh_Amendment_to_th...

Yes, we have 435 people who could do that.

But in any given year, at least 200 of them will be elected specifically for the purpose of ensuring that government does nothing at all. So the remaining ones go to extraordinary effort to achieve even the basics, and often fail.

Like things are quite partisan at the moment in the congress. You don't want dead lock, but you do want things to be somewhat difficult to change other wise you will get lots of policy, regulatory and even legal whiplash. If things change too often it could even be worse. Ideally there is some middle ground between deadlock and whip lash. Constant flux is worse than dead lock. It's even why a lot laws regarding regulation, policy ect.. have a date they became effective so people can prepare.
You're kind of mixing up two different things that can be separately analyzed and performed. One is the writing of regulations, which Congress can (and probably should) delegate to administrative bodies. But the interpretation and enforcement of those regulations can, and often does, get put in front of courts. Administrative law judges specialize in hearing cases involving these regulations.

The question in this case is whether juries are also needed in order to survive Constitutional scrutiny, and this opinion concludes it does. So we don't necessarily have to throw out the baby with the bathwater: administrative agencies can coexist with the need for protections for criminal and civil defendants who are subject to the rules they promulgate.

> Are there 435 people in this nation well versed enough to write detailed regulations on nitty gritty details about Securities on Monday, regulations on Agriculture on Tuesday, rules for calculating acceptable emissions for Coal Fired Power Plants based on service area, customers, and operating capacity on Wednesday and so forth.

They certainly could be well-versed enough to supervise the work of picking the best proposals in each of these domains. Each Congress-critter has enough paid staff to basically be their own public-policy think tank.

They can delegate to agencies. The ruling isn't preventing them from doing that, it's just preventing the adjudication of penalties from being carried out by those agencies.

The SEC still gets to make the rules, they just don't also get to impose penalties on their own, without a jury trial.

In theory, yes.

From a practical perspective, many of these rules are only implemented and enforceable because of the "in-house" self-adjudication framework, that operates on the presumption that it's own regs are lawfully valid, and don't have to repeatedly convince outside judges and juries to choose to enforce the sometimes absurd or overreaching rules that only make logical and legal sense to those sheltered within the bureaucratic bubble.

And they only avoid being struck from the books entirely because self-adjudication basically negates any chance of 1st-round judicial review/ scrutiny and other legal protections that are baked into Article III courts.

Which has resulted in agencies being far more aggressive with their rule making than they'd otherwise be.

Additionally, taking into account the game-theory of the framework, the upfront costs and risk vs reward put applicants at a major disadvantage, even before you take into account the effectively endless resources at the disposal of the government. Add the fact that beurocratic delay can tactically benefit an "adversarial" govt agent at little to no net cost or consequence to them personally or to the agency. while simultaneously increasing the applicant's direct application/ compliance/ litigation costs, plus costs and other risks incurred by delay of the project, costs due to govt-demanded project changes or added permitting conditions, and the uncertainty of whether the project is ultimately approved/ permitted at all.

It's not an "end of the world" ruling as some are claiming, but it will have substantial higher order effects beyond ability to impose penalties.

Ya, I agree with you on all that. I will note however that they only began self-adjudicating in 2011, so on its own this probably isn't a big deal. If the non-delegation principle is expanded by the supreme court though, it could be.
There are only 15 cabinet secretaries, each if which heads an executive branch agency. If 15 such can manage and set priorities for such an agency, it should be much easier for 435 people to spread the load and oversee those agencies, including the relevant degree of delegation to agency or independent experts that might be appropriate to a particular issue
… those 15 cabinet secretaries employ more than 4 million people.
Who’s historical court would you like to reference? We’ve not been a country for as long as there have been traditions and laws about finance in particular. We fought for independence from a monarchy and its kingdom, not to be free from governance.
We could have started with our own legal decisions without reference to precedent. After all, that's what early English decisions themselves frequently did. They were based on logic, by reference to statutory text, and by weighing the pros and cons of various alternatives, not precedent.
>After all, that's what early English decisions themselves frequently did.

Not really. What's commonly called English Common Law is itself an Anglo-Saxon bastardization of Norman Law. Even American Law borrows directly from Norman Law in the formers now dwindling but still surviving usage of Latin.

>They were based on logic, by reference to statutory text, and by weighing the pros and cons of various alternatives, not precedent.

While I agree with the premise that is how law should be, that's generally not how it was nor is it so simple to accomplish. A quote to one should remember is that "[A]ny Anglo-American lawyer must cope with a sneaking feeling that there is no such thing as first principles, just one damned case after another."

At the founding, the Constitution documented all the things that were going to be different, but courts were intended to continue to apply the rest of the common law as it was. So, it's less about being beholden to England's legal history as much as it is being beholden to American history as it was at the time. It's just that most of the legal writing that courts depended upon was published by English legal scholars.

One of the downsides of the fixed written Constitution being hard to change is that you end up with these strange rules where the law today is dependent upon intuition about how a current problem would have been viewed through the lens of the common law at the time of the founding, and we mostly only have English legal treatises to fall back on, so it feels like being beholden to English legal history.

>It will be very interesting to see what happens if SCOTUS tries to roll back the administrative state...

"Interesting" to say the least. Trying to govern a modern nation of 370 million people based on a literal 18th-century interpretation of a Constitution designed to govern a handful of former colonies is going to be a (very predictable) disaster, which is why the Court hasn't done it before.

Appeal to modernity fallacy (I just invented it).

But you’re wrong to argue the “court hasn’t done it”, because the court has been doing it all along. It’s called precedence.

I was referring specifically to striking down long-standing precedents that endorsed mechanisms like SEC enforcement, and interpreting a right of privacy. What we're seeing is a dramatically stripped-down view of the Constitution. If it were being done as part of a broad social consensus that included a plan to revamp the Constitution to meet modern needs, it would be difficult but beneficial in the long run. But what's happening is more akin to tearing down your own house while you're living in it, with no plan for how to rebuild it.
You say tearing down, I say reverting tacky renovations that clash with the intended architectural style.

The structural bones of the constitution itself remain strong, and are made more resilient by removing ad-hoc modifications currently straining that framework beyond its intended yielding limits.

The framing of a house is strong, too, but you can't live in it. Our society and economy are mind-boggling complex compared to the state they were in 1789. Whether you liked the renovations or not is immaterial, they serve a function. Unless you have a plan to replace that function (other than just hand-waving "send it all to the courts"), it will be a disaster.
This country became a world superpower with 100 million residents before it got any of the modern administrative state.
I think you've got things a bit off. I think more correct ones are:

- "This country became a world power with 76 million residents in 1900 before it got any of the Progressive era administrative state."

- "The country became a world superpower with 180 million residents in 1960 before it got the modern administrative state"

You wrote "world superpower", but the US didn't become a world superpower until WW2, well after ~1915, which is when the population reached 100M.

While the US started becoming a world power in 1898, with the Spanish-American War, and fully became a world power by WWI, that was after the Interstate Commerce Commission was formed in 1887, as the first administrative agency.

Now, you wrote "modern", which of course is in the eye of the beholder and likely is meant to exclude the ICC. Did the modern era start in 1906, with the FDA and the Federal Meat Inspection Act? Or Wilson, with the Federal Reserve (1913) and the FTC (1914)? Or the New Deal (1930s), like the SEC (1934)?

You'll note that all of those were before the US became a modern world superpower, and several before the US population reached 100M.

On the other hand, this beholder - https://ballotpedia.org/Administrative_state - points out that the modern administrative state didn't start until 1964 with Johnson's Great Society programs.

Here's another equally true statement:

- "The country became a world superpower with 203 million residents in 1970 before 18 year olds had the right to vote."

While true, that wouldn't justify removing the franchise from modern 18 year old.

Your observation, even when corrected, seems to be similarly weak as an argument to remove administrative agencies.

> Or Wilson, with the Federal Reserve (1913) […]

The Fed wasn't even the first US central bank. The Founding Fathers (e.g., Morris, Hamilton) created them very early on:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_central_banking_in_...

As I understand it, the complaint about the "administrative state" is that administrative agencies have the ability to regulate and assess fines or other judgments that should properly be part of Congress and the court system.

For example, the Federal Reserve can assess fines without going to court, like: "Federal Reserve Fines Deutsche Bank $41 Million for Deficient Anti-Money Laundering Program" - https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-reserve-fines-deutsche-...

Did the First Bank of the US have regulatory abilities and the ability to access civil fines?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Bank_of_the_United_State... says it "did not set monetary policy, regulate private banks, hold their excess reserves, or act as a lender of last resort", which would suggest the answer is "no".

If correct, that would mean it's not part of the "administrative state".

The practical answer is that every country needs a body of law to "bootstrap" with, and English common and case law isn't the worst place to start.
And the two major alternative starting points used in practice are Roman law or Sharia law, both of which are likely even less acceptable to someone who doesn't want the baggage of English common law.

On the other hand, in the civil law systems when new countries are formed, as soon as you get the core laws passed (which takes some years of transition) you do generally make a clean start where only the new code of laws matter and everything else is discarded - you explicitly choose which parts of earlier code get included in the new laws, and that's it, old laws get pulled out only if there's a relevant dispute about some events which happened back when those old laws were in force.

The code of Hammurabi (eye for an eye) seemed to be popular back in the day.

One must wonder if its host nation-state had survived for longer, what iteration would be out in the wild.

> The code of Hammurabi (eye for an eye) seemed to be popular back in the day.

"Eye for an eye" comes from the Book of Exodus, and it was meant not as a prescription, but as a limitation:

> The intent behind the principle was to restrict compensation to the value of the loss.[1]

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eye_for_an_eye

While Book of Exodus may be a major bringer of "eye for an eye" to western culture, it is certainly not the origin of the principle. The Hammurabi code predates the events described in the book of Exodus (and thus the book of Exodus) by many centuries, and does encode "Eye for an eye" as a literal prescription (If an citizen should blind the eye of another citizen, they shall blind his eye.)

So it was also a prescription - but yes, as you say, it is also a limitation for retaliation, assigning an equivalent punishment to limit escalation of vengeance.

No they don't. As I said elsewhere, even early English common law was often not written with reference to precedent. You'll see this if you read early English cases.
Sure our forefathers needed some bootstraps, but we’re coming up on 250 years of independence here.
Practical, not good :-)
> Also, personally it drives me crazy when American legal discussions fall back to English legal traditions. Didn’t we fight a big revolution so we wouldn’t have to live with all that baggage?

No, actually, the revolution mainly had the opposite intent: anger that England was denying the English colonists the rights they were entitled to as Englishmen and would have enjoyed in England.

IANL a quick look here [0] does say that court case United States v. Wonson (1812) established the historical test, which interpreted the amendment as relying on English common law to determine whether a jury trial was necessary in a civil suit; around the same time as the War of 1812.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventh_Amendment_to_the_Unite...

We fought the war to restructure the government. I think if you told the revolutionaries they were fighting to abandon those traditions they'd be very upset.
Awesome write up thank you.

What about executive orders?

That seems like extreme overreach of the executive branch.

It's it being used in an emergency either.

The presidents are issuing hundreds of them during their terms.

> The presidents are passing hundreds of them during their terms.

There is a major lack of oversight on Executive Orders.

BUT for the most part they are an accurate use from what I can tell. Usually they are merely aspirational goals for agencies to implement, much more similar to a CEO's quarterly goals for subdivisions. The President is a dual office role of being head of the executive branch, and being head of the military.

I don't really see that much straight up unilateral ordering of specific actions, and those would be the only constitutionally questionable ones.

Are they creating new laws with Executive actions?

That would seem like it falls under the legislative branch.

Executive Orders, technically, are only orders from the Executive (the President) to the rest of the branch. As in, they can only tell the rest of the Executive Branch what to do, not create laws. However, with how much Congress has delegated to Executive Agencies, there's a lot more overlap and gray area than there was 233 years ago.

For example, the CDC has the authority to mandate certain things in the name of public health, because Congress created the HHS (who oversees the CDC) with the express purpose of doing so. So an Executive Order directed at the CDC can, in a sense, give the President that power.

Every creature from the New Deal is probably unconstitutional.

Additional context on that threat of court packing is that the Supreme Court was already invalidating and gutting the New Deal! Its such an important story to me because my grade school history books all upheld the New Deal as this monumental and amazing thing.

From what I can tell, 75% of it (or 75% of the programs it created) was declared unconstitutional, and everything else just hasn't been challenged yet!

And of the things that were challenged and declared constitutional, it was under the threat of court packing! Now, 3-5 generations later, the Supreme Court just can't imagine how society functions by ruling accurately to begin with! I'm pretty interested in any court unwinding this incongruency.

I think implicit in your comment is that the New Deal must not actually be amazing because it turns out that it's likely unconstitutional but... how does that logically follow? It's not like the Constitution was handed down from the heavens as a flawless document.

It may be that the New Deal does contain many unconstitutional provisions, but also that that same legislature was in fact a net benefit for Americans.

There’s a process for that. The authority to override or change the constitution is not given to a single government branch but to the states. We’ve had an amendment as late as the 1990s, so it isn’t as of the constitution is immutable.

The authority of each government branch is explicitly enumerated. I’d rather them behave according to the contract they are beholden to than decide they have whatever authority they wish. That’s no longer a constitutional republic.

I’m not saying that a constitutional republic is the end all, be all. I’m just saying there is a process for getting things done and it is supposed to checked by the constitution and the other federal branches. That can be changed by amendment or revolution, but should not be changed by the whim of politicians.

Net positive and constitutional are mutually exclusive concepts. That I do agree, and I agree that my earlier statement doesn't seem to give room for that level of nuance.

It just so happens that all my causes and grudges are from creatures of the New Deal, and I'm not in a position to bring them before the courts yet. Imagine my excitement when I realized how flimsy that era's legislative flurry really was.

> It's not like the Constitution was handed down from the heavens as a flawless document.

au contraire, in some opinions

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_civil_religion

Processes were included to amend the constitution for this exact reason! Of course the framers knew that it was a flawed document.
If you look at the data, industrial production starts bouncing back when the worst provisions of the New Deal get struck down by the courts. It was very much self-defeating, the only part that helped was devaluing the dollar wrt. the main foreign currencies.
Show this data please
Finally, a reason for conservative FDR-hate that I can understand.

Seriously, this is not a sarcastic or troll post. I have always been confused about this.

I'm not sure why its confusing. Conservatives have historically proclaimed themselves to be (in their words even if the actions don't always match) in favor of small government, reduced government spending, and the minimal taxation required to keep a small government functioning.

FDR implemented a bunch of large social programs which naturally grow the government, spend more money, and therefore require more tax dollars to fund.

Social programs that redistribute money have long been considered a form of forced charity which many conservatives think is immoral.

Disclaimer: Not taking a side here. In 2022 I don't think we have a "good" political party in the US let alone a perfect one.

“Conservatism” is a tent with a lot of different groups, most of whom dislike FDR for somewhat different reasons. There’s small government conservatives like you mention. There are legal conservatives who are animated more by being sticklers for the rules than opposition to government social programs per se. There’s also lots of folks, maybe the biggest group, who like the New Deal but resent FDR judicial appointees for their tendency to ignore clear Constitutional limits on the federal government one hand, while on the other hand reading in lots of restrictions on state moral and social regulation that aren’t so apparent in the Constitutional text or history.
See also: FDR banning private ownership of gold.
Excellent explanation.

I wonder what % of the entire judiciary budget could be paid via the budget SEC division of enforcement.

From that standpoint, this assertion of jurisdiction could entail a better staffed judiciary.