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by somezero
1501 days ago
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The only way to provably prevent Sybil attacks are CAs (https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/sybil.pdf)
This is why almost all P2P and DHT papers assumed existence of a CA in their system model eg. Castro’s secure routing etc. P.S. PoS protocols are also Sybil resistance mechanisms. Look into Tendermint and compare it with, say, PBFT. |
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> This paper shows that the situation with BFT CRDTs is very different from BFT consensus: it is possible to guarantee the standard CRDT consistency properties even in systems in which arbitrarily many nodes are Byzantine, e.g. where the Byzantine nodes outnumber the correct nodes. This makes the algorithms immune to Sybil attacks, allowing them to be deployed in open P2P systems that anybody can join, without requiring proof-of-work or proof of any other resource.
[0]: https://martin.kleppmann.com/papers/bft-crdt-papoc22.pdf