[sT370ma2]

Why is everyone ignoring the argument that Truecrypt and Veracrypt don't require a TPM to very securely encrypt a hard drive; therefore, TPM's are not even necessary to prevent a laptop thief from having access to corporate data or a company's internal network? If a securely-encrypted hard drive can be accomplished without a TPM (in or outside the CPU), why is a TPM in the CPU desirable? It seems to provide no real improvement in security will providing enormous potential for abuse. The only scenario that I can envision is that an employee simply refuses to encrypt his hard drive, even after he has been threatened with being fired if he does not. Does this happen often enough to justify the potential for abuse that a TPM inside the CPU affords--and in fact, assured abuse in countries like North Korea. By the way, I read today the Dell and Intel had decided not to use Pluton. How do you explain that if Pluton is so necessary.