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A few points that in the course of being typed out turned into a small essay: Modern conventional warfare is extremely deadly: essentially, if a target can be seen it can be destroyed. Anything in the open will eventually be destroyed. Tanks are not especially more vulnerable to this danger than any other ground vehicle; they are larger, more visible targets, but that is somewhat offset by their armor. If you're looking at all the wrecked Russian T-72s in Ukraine and asking "why have tanks?" you could just as easily look at all the wrecked BMPs and BMDs and ask "why have infantry fighting vehicles?" or at all the wrecked supply convoys and ask "why have trucks?" The answer of course is because you need the mobility and firepower that vehicles provide, but the trade off is that the battlefield is very, very deadly for vehicles. Tanks cannot take the lead in urban operations because the terrain is too restricted and their situational awareness too low. But, their direct firepower can be essential in urban operations: think of a rifle squad pinned down by sniper fire from the upper floors of a building at the end of the block, which is something a tank can easily destroy with minimal risk. As the above point alludes to, tanks and infantry fight more effectively as a team than they can separately. Depending on the mission, terrain, and enemy disposition, a tank can be a more effective weapon than infantry, and vice-versa. But by having both working together, they are able to compensate for the others weaknesses. In the course of a battle, the more effective arm at a given moment is liable to change back and forth multiple times: sometimes the infantry will be making the main effort, sometimes the tanks; sometimes the infantry will be maneuvering while the tanks support by fire, sometimes the tanks maneuver while the infantry supports by fire. The Russians have been particularly bad at this last point in Ukraine. Partly, this appears to a be a result of their infantry formations being significantly understrength; even if they were at full strength, their TOEs (Table of Organization and Equipment) for various infantry unit types suggest notably less strength than their western counterparts. The Battalion Tactical Group organization, as an ad hoc formation, also means that the infantry and armor in a given BTG have probably never trained to fight together as a team: it makes a big difference to go to war with people you've trained as a team with for months/years than with people you met two weeks ago. I think the big takeaway from Ukraine is not that tanks are especially vulnerable on contemporary battlefield, but that unprepared and disorganized Russian tankers are going to die as quickly as the rest of the Russian army when confronting a tough, well-trained, determined opponent equipped with weapons specifically engineered to destroy their vehicles. |