[kjeetgill]

This is kind of the brilliance of git forcing users to refer to commits by hashes, all the things you're referring to don't modify commits, they make new ones.

Braches are the the only mutable place where you have it point to different commits in a sequence.

I could imagine in some horrific alternate universe someone deciding to hide hashes as not user friendly. Like, I think we got incredibly lucky how that played out.

[GauntletWizard]

You can experience this alternate universe right now in Github Actions, which allows you to refer to other "Actions" by their tag, and encourages you to pin yourself to a "v3" which the team will then destroy and replace to update you.

If this sounds terrible, insecure, and begging to be exploited, it's because every idiot on the Github Actions Team should be censured for their poor understanding of Git, Github, and yet proceeding to ship anyway.

[hermanb]

I’ve been wondering about this too and always used full sha’s until now. But recently I’ve made an action myself: You actually need to publish the action to the marketplace with each tag manually. It feels like there might be more going on.

Is GitHub storing those published tags and avoiding tampering by only letting you use those tags once? Are they warning or blocking runs if you tamper? …

I’m really curious because it seems like SUCH a giant risk otherwise.

[GauntletWizard]

Nope, they even suggest (and companies have built tooling around) deleting versions of the tags.

[WorldMaker]

Deleting a tag is a force push operation like any other and repo policies that block force pushes will block tag updates.

Tags themselves aren't necessarily the worst idea, but yes policies encouraging force pushes are likely to experience exploitation.

Also, annotated tags have their own "commit" hashes, and can be code signed like any other commit. There are more precautions that could be taken.

[Arnavion]

When the threat is an action repo becoming malicious and force-pushing its existing tags to malicious code, the policies of the action repo preventing force-pushes is not a safeguard.

[WorldMaker]

I agree; there should be more protections and I'm pointing out that they could be offered. Github could certainly enforce at the platform level that the only tags allowed for use in Actions must be annotated, maybe even signed, and must never be force-pushed.

The use of tags isn't necessarily the wrong strategy: I'm mostly just pointing out it is treating tags as mutably as branches that is the problem. I don't think you should ever force push a tag, personally, and I always find it problematic when people treat tags like branches and confuse the two.

[jrockway]

Yeah this is all kind of lazy glue code. The same thing happens with Docker; people refer to foobar:latest, and that changes over time and is annoying/a good attack vector. (All the tags are mutable, of course, not just "latest".) What should happen in both cases is that "v3" or "latest" should be read at the time you submit the configuration and stored as the unique id (commit id for git, sha256 for container images). This does have the downside that you have to check that "v3" and "latest" are still what you want every time you apply an edit to the action, but at least you were tangentially involved rather than pure action at a distance.

[GauntletWizard]

There are vendors that I would be fine pinning to a vendors signature instead, but yeah. There is, thankfully, a lot of kubernetes tooling around this workflow

[Arnavion]

Indeed, all the actions tell you to use them via tags.

And then GitHub comes and recommends you (in a doc that you're unlikely to find unless you know to look for it) to use SHAs to protect yourself from the attack that they themselves enabled.

https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-...