[judge2020]

The actual attestation process protects against this:

program generates random bytes->ask tpm to sign it->on signature return, program asks TPM for its public key->program verifies public key matches that of the signature->verify the public key is cross-signed by the manufacturer's certificate authority. The only attack here would be if Intel or AMD's PKI is compromised, which would certainly be leveraged against enterprise customers before any consumer customers got hit.

[nybble41]

With regard to supply-chain attacks, since the TPMs are manufactured in China, they can just make a perfectly "genuine" TPM with a valid, signed key which has their backdoor. The attestation process protects DRM users (media companies) from device owners. It doesn't protect device owners from TPM manufacturers.

[judge2020]

The TPMs are in-chip now, so they’re made in the TSMC Taiwan fab along with the rest of the die.

[nybble41]

As I said—manufactured in China. Both the government of mainland China and the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) consider mainland China and Taiwan to be parts of the same country. They only differ with regard to who is in charge.

The issue could be addressed without removing the ability to attest as to the TPM's origin by including a protocol for the owner to dump the device's private encryption keys (e.g. by shorting one of the external pins to ground). The fixed attestation key set by the manufacturer would need to be restricted so that it can only be used to sign attestation messages, with all other keys being generated on the device so that they can be reset when the device changes owners.