| > this type of failure mode of the air france crash wouldn’t have happened in a boeing airplane; the pilots would have realized what was going on within seconds. Say what? Atlas Air face planted a 767 with pilots doing just that: > The captain’s and the FO’s opposing elevator control > forces continued for about 10 seconds, during which the > airplane’s dive continued to steepen. Thus, the NTSB > concludes that the captain’s failure to command a positive > transfer of control of the airplane as soon as he attempted > to intervene on the controls enabled the FO to continue to > force the airplane into a steepening dive. Or the Air France thing that's now on the front page. In a Boeing 777. Poor training is poor training. Physical feedback is not a safety benefit. It sounds nice in theory but in practice doesn't do much. You can easily say the same thing about A vs B thrust levers, look at that Sriwijaya Air crash. The Boeing design sounds more intuitive until you look at crashes where the feedback didn't do a single thing to help the pilots or avoid a crash. |