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by tialaramex
1518 days ago
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> And if you call those messages equivalent then there is no cryptographic failing. You'll need better than that argument. Defining failure as success is very, very stupid. Nobody needs to "do better" than calling your position out as wrong. > Nobody complains that RSA gives you the same result for 45 and 0045 after all. RSA doesn't give you "the same result for 45 and 0045" unless what you mean by "0045" is "Actually just 45 except for some reason I write that with extra zeroes as part of my bad faith argument". Hash algorithms that don't work aren't "just fine" they're useless. The reason algorithms like SHA-256 are defined for bits isn't arbitrary - bits are literally the unit of information, this is the obvious and natural way to define the function, so choosing to define a function over "really wide bytes" doesn't make any sense. |
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It's not going to be convincing unless you can talk about a specific attack. And in particular, that attack should be more relevant to real-world use than a weakness like length extension.
Especially because you could look at this weakness as a sibling attack to length extension, one that's mildly easier to pull off but you can only append zeros. That seems safer overall to me. And it's not reasonable to completely excuse one flaw as needing "misuse" but not the other.
> The reason algorithms like SHA-256 are defined for bits isn't arbitrary - bits are literally the unit of information, this is the obvious and natural way to define the function, so choosing to define a function over "really wide bytes" doesn't make any sense.
A hash algorithm that takes an input in bytes is not a failure. If you think taking single bits is actually necessary, rather than just 'obvious and natural', then I really think you're not analyzing the security properly.