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by vlovich123
1516 days ago
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Open source doesn’t actually matter here. A closed source electronic system should work just as well. Why? The way it should work is the machine should just print out a scantron AND a human legible copy (probably with a bar code linking the two). The person submits both by hand. You get early results by counting the scantron. Before certification, there is a statistically significant manual counting of the human legible ballots. For tighter races you recount all. The linked barcode lets you also statistically cross-validate in case there was a discrepancy between the machine readable copy printed and the hand ballot (you sample randomly). Open source means absolutely 0 here. There are too many vectors of attack (eg physically compromising a machine, chain of custody, malware etc). Better to assume the machine is compromised and build a system that doesn’t care. |
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And yet at that time Diebold had a system that did NOT do that deployed all across the US. Someone was deleting votes, and it wasn’t being logged.
Here’s lawmakers saying “should” do something, and an opaque reality where that didn’t happen. It was also running windows…
This is an attack vector. I prefer transparency. Open source would help.