[thwayunion]

> Humans can create notation and formalisms, but they do not invent the truths those mathematics represent.

The land represented by a map exists independently of humanity. Another intelligent species would have to come up with a roughly isomorphic representation if they wanted a similar tool.

Maps, to be clear, are just invented tools. They can be more or less right or wrong, but they are not the territory.

Moving up the meta stack does sort of confuse this initially if you don't stay grounded. I wonder if there is a field of meta-map-making and whether map makers sometimes confuse maps with territories when they start meta-map-making work.

> I frequently encounter this perspective and worry there's a fundamental problem with how mathematics is taught if so many people walk away believing this.

I didn't walk away (undergrad, PhD, PI, editorial committees, grant reviewer, ...). I'm about as far from walking away as is possible. But I suppose it is possible I'm an imposture :)

[VirusNewbie]

'roughly isomorphic' would be saying 'not isomorphic', so I'm not sure what you're trying to say. Actually I'm frustrated with most physicists/math folks misusing this term 'isomorphism' to mean "a bijection".

Which gets to the second point, if there is a true isomorphism between the map and the land, it doesn't matter that one isn't the other. That would mean that the land is constrained by the same axioms as the 'map', which gives some significance to them.

[thwayunion]

It's not a bijection either. If we take your level of pedantry seriously, it's nothing. There are no mathematical structures in play. I'm using natural language words to describe informal ideas outside of any mathematical system.

Let's use bloogidy-blop to avoid silly arguments over sequences of characters that have clear contextual meaning which you refuse to acknowledge for some reason :)

I'm not sure what your second point is supposed to be. Here's the relevant quotes:

>>> Humans can create notation and formalisms, but they do not invent the truths those mathematics represent.

>> The land represented by a map exists independently of humanity. Another intelligent species would have to come up with a roughly isomorphic representation if they wanted a similar tool.

> Which gets to the second point, if there is a true isomorphism between the map and the land, it doesn't matter that one isn't the other. That would mean that the land is constrained by the same axioms as the 'map', which gives some significance to them.

Right... but I didn't say that there was a bloogidy-blop between maps and land. I said that a useful alien map would have to be roughly bloogidy-blop to our maps. So I'm not really sure what you're trying to say here that is relevant to my original post.

[TheOtherHobbes]

This is clearly not true. If the aliens happened to be 10% or 1000% of our size, their concept of a relevant physical feature would be very different.

Maps are basically feature extraction -> data compression. The feature extraction part is subjective and depends on the experience of a species.

A map of cellphone towers is useless to a cat. A map of blobblytoids is useless to a human who doesn't know what a blobblytoid is or how to recognise one.

A human may have some vague awareness that something is there, but it's also possible that blobblytoids look like random noise, or like weird probabilistic anomalies that travel around inside a multidimensional space, or like something completely unimaginable.

So in the limit features can't be extracted because they are invisible to a different consciousness. They can still be physically present, but their meaning as a feature of interest depends on having a subjective referent for them.

This seems to be something many humans struggle with. We assume everyone else - including other humans - has the same set of referents, and therefore our personal feature maps are somehow universal.

Of course they aren't. They aren't even universal among humans, never mind a completely unknown alien species.

[mxkopy]

I think there is some sort of threshold analogous to Turing-completeness (it probably is just Turing-completeness) when it comes to intelligence, in that information is eventually accessible to any system that passes it.

If there is a species that thinks in terms of things that humans never could understand, then I would argue that species isn't part of our physical reality. If their expression of concepts is at all rooted in physical reality, then we, as physical beings, would have access to it. Maybe not the first person that sees it, nor the second, nor their great-great-great-grandchildren, but at some point their children could build things/begin to appreciate what was being communicated.

[JackFr]

> If there is a species that thinks in terms of things that humans never could understand, then I would argue that species isn't part of our physical reality.

What if they think can think in our terms AND they can think thoughts we are physically unable to, thoughts that are literally inconceivable?

[mxkopy]

If the thoughts have any interaction at all between each other, we would be able to leverage that to understand those higher-level thoughts to the degree that they affect the ones on our level. As an analogy, we can project an N dimensional object onto N! planes and get a complete, but not intuitive, description of what it is.

Maybe they know the exact value of Chaitin's constant, but at least we know its properties.

[thwayunion]

Yes, the exact sense in which maps are bloogidy-blop to one another may vary considerably, but if they cover the same geographic region there'll be some bloogidy-blop, ie common reference points, which would relate to the maps. Maybe blobblytoids always go in valleys. Or whatever.

We seem in agreement on the object question in any case.

[VirusNewbie]

Well, we can say 'an equivalence' (or adjoint) which would be accurate and still using natural language, no?

Onto my second point, you don't need an isomorphism, an equivalence works fine if you find that the axioms hold in both cases, no? So now you're not just working with a 'formalism' that has no basis in reality.

Otherwise, if reality wasn't constrained by axioms (or even meta axioms) we'd use it to do things we couldn't with our formalisms.

[thwayunion]

> Well, we can say 'an equivalence' (or adjoint) which would be accurate and still using natural language, no?

No, their maps could be VERY different but be used in roughly the same way and therefore useful in the same way. There is an operator involved -- reading/navigating/interpreting -- which is why I chose "isomorphism" instead of "equivalent".

Also, "isomorphism" IS natural language that is used in many fields outside of mathematics and also has a vernacular sense to it. The word happens to also be used to describe certain formal constructions by mathematicians from time to time, but it is natural language.

Again, this is all very pedantic and silly. I insist on bloogity-blop. If we're going to have silly arguments, let's use silly words :)

> Onto my second point, you don't need an isomorphism, an equivalence works fine if you find that the axioms hold in both cases, no? So now you're not just working with a 'formalism' that has no basis in reality.

Reality isn't constrained by maps.

Useful maps are constrained by reality.

> Otherwise, if reality wasn't constrained by axioms (or even meta axioms) we'd use it to do things we couldn't with our formalisms.

Huh? I can't use reality the way I use maps because I'm not always able to fly into the air and look around before navigating to the supermarket or a trail head.

Reality is not constrained by my inReach. I promise you it's the other way around. And I promise you I can't fly, which means I need maps, even if flying high into the air would make it way easier to find a trail head than following a not-great trail map.

Maps are useful. Very useful. But they DO NOT constrain reality.

A belief to the contrary in the case of mathematics and physics is quite spiritual. Which was kind of my original point :)

[whatshisface]

Any species would prove the exact same theorems given the same axioms, and since mathematicians only claim that their axioms imply their theorems, I think they are right to claim absolute truth.

[pfortuny]

Oh, dear. Truth being the operating word… There is no truth in a set of axioms we cannot even conceive properly (any infinite set has properties beyond what seems reasonable, even “just” the Natural numbers). From that comes arithmetic, the “most elementary” form of mathematics which cannot be proved consistent…

We (I am a working mathematician) do not understand our objects, we can just make do. Only finite graph theory has a chance of being “real”. And it stops being finite very soon.

And we certainly should be honest enough to admit that our “science” says very little about the “real” world, where truth lies.

Maths is just a tool. Funny, exciting and even in some sense beautiful. But “truth” does it not contain. Except, I insist, in very specific finite constructions.

Statements hold but they are not “true” because they do not relate to the real world (otherwise, Frodo reaching Mount Doom would also be “true”).

There are no continuous functions out there. Bolzano’s theorem is not “true”.

[whatshisface]

I would contend that A -> B can be true even if A is not true or more relevantly to this discussion if A is unknown. That's math's version of objective truth, where "A" is filled by our various axioms and rules of inference.

[macrolocal]

In ~300 BCE, Euclid decides to work with morphisms not objects.

[meroes]

How can you explain appealing to these “unreal objects” (real numbers, set theory, arithmetic) * does* help science? (Effectiveness maybe)

I see you are also a non realist about science.

But even the methodological naturalist (one who takes natural empirical science to be the best method but not an ontology) must wonder how we are uncovering and putting more precision to more and more of the world.

I don’t think we can currently explain why this made up tool “works”.

[zmgsabst]

The enduring appeal of both triangles and Frodo is that they relate a truth that is hard to see, because it’s diffuse and abstract.

But that “abstract truth” is why your pizza doesn’t flop if you fold it or Amazon can’t make a good LOTR.

[VirusNewbie]

> From that comes arithmetic, the “most elementary” form of mathematics which cannot be proved consistent…

This is kind of wrong. Are you familiar with Godel's thoughts on this?

[uoaei]

...are you?

[VirusNewbie]

Very much so.

[uoaei]

So lording esoteric knowledge over the anonymous rabble is more productive than just explaining what is the issue?

[housecarpenter]

Any species could prove the same theorems given the same axioms, but (besides the fact that they might not choose the same axioms) I'm not sure if they would prove the same subset of theorems that we have proven/will prove. Perhaps they'd have different ideas about what is interesting.

[whatshisface]

Human mathematicians are already fanning out into other systems of deduction (constructive mathematics being a great example), and given enough time the mathematicians of each galaxy will eventually discover the other galaxy's mathematics, even if it perhaps happens in a different order.

[ganzuul]

Surely intergalactic mathematicians already know that the only time is now? =)

> As Prigogine explains, determinism is fundamentally a denial of the arrow of time. With no arrow of time, there is no longer a privileged moment known as the "present," which follows a determined "past" and precedes an undetermined "future." All of time is simply given, with the future as determined or as undetermined as the past. With irreversibility, the arrow of time is reintroduced to physics.

[thwayunion]

This is either an extremely obvious and boring observation or the basis for a metaphysical trip, depending on how pre-disposed you are to "mathematical spiritualism" :)

[whatshisface]

Nothing can be objectively interesting, only objectively true. Just because math is objectively true does not mean you've been robbed of your license to decide if you think it's interesting. :)

[thwayunion]

Agreed. Similarly, just because I don't "get" church doesn't mean I can prove God doesn't exist. And it certainly doesn't mean I should stand in the way of others enjoying the experience of going to church regardless of their beliefs. It just means I don't "get" it.

[whatshisface]

Religion is slightly different though, they claim actual direct truth (not mere truth of implication given certain assumptions) which makes their claims more interesting but prevents them from claiming automatic objective truth. The Formal Gospel would go, "If God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son, ..." ;)

[thwayunion]

That's why I used words like "spirituality" and "faith" instead of "religion" and "dogma".

I'm describing a shared social/psychological phenomenon, not a shared epistemological status.

Read my posts less as works of the philosophy of mathematics and more as anthropological musings.

[stonemetal12]

That begs the question. Would any other species pick the exact same axioms? Why would they have the exact same theorems? Are you suggesting there is only one way to think logically?

[dane-pgp]

Any species would face a selective pressure towards theorems which help them understand the world around them (if they have any motivation to prove theorems at all), and they will similarly face a pressure towards choosing the smallest/simplest set of axioms which allows all those theorems to be proven (and new ones to be discovered).

In fact, if we assume that neural networks are the only sorts of intelligence that can occur naturally in the universe and be sophisticated enough for arbitrary abstract calculation[0], then we might be able to infer things about the sorts of concepts they will develop and in what order. For example, having the concept of finite sums would likely occur before having the concept of infinite sums.

[0] I know that cellular automata can emulate a universal Turing machine, but I can't imagine a situation existing in nature where the cells evolve into an arrangement that produces a Turing machine, much less a machine running a program of instructions that lead to it generating mathematical theorems.

[JackFr]

> Any species would prove the exact same theorems given the same axioms

Assume there exists at least one species....

[marcosdumay]

> I wonder if there is a field of meta-map-making

There certainly is, although I'm not sure it has a name. Kids gets introductions to it on schools, when they have classes about how to read a map in Geography.