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by zachlloyd
1537 days ago
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As the author of the post, I think this is totally reasonable feedback and something we have discussed quite a bit on the team. The general stance on telemetry that we have is that
a) we are just starting and it's really helpful to see which of our product ideas are useful to our users (e.g. does anyone use AI Command Search? Should we continue to invest in it)
b) we tried to be very explicit about what we are and are not sending - it is only metadata and never command input or output (you can see the full list of events we track here: https://docs.warp.dev/getting-started/privacy#exhaustive-tel...
c) if you aren't comfortable with telemetry, then please don't use the product just yet - we will make telemetry opt-in when we have a large enough sample size that we can be confident extrapolating what's going on For googleapis - this is for login. We use firebase as our auth provider. For segment - this is for temeletry, as you point out. For sentry - this is for crash reporting. As for why we have accounts, it's because we are starting to add features for teams and it's important in that context that there is some type of identity associated with the user. But like I said at the start - the feedback is totally reasonable and we are trying to figure out how to balance concerns here while still being in a good place to iterate on and improve the product. |
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I'd be much more trustful of your product (and indeed, I do desperately need a better terminal!) if you were to:
- make Sentry crash reporting opt-in (or at the very least have a popup that occurs with the content of what will be sent to Sentry before anything is sent to Sentry), AND
- clarify in your event telemetry documentation, and explicitly in your Privacy Policy, that ONLY the event ID/name, timing, and the user ID are sent to Segment, nothing else.
But I simply cannot use a terminal where my keystrokes might be logged to anyone's Sentry or Segment account - even if it were our company's own Sentry account. The risk of partner-entrusted credential leakage into an insecure environment is simply too high.