[dr_orpheus]

You can broadly say that both Challenger and Columbia disasters can be attributed to failures in communication. But the Rogers Commission Report (presidential commission for investigating Challenger) doesn't really show quite the same scenario.

At the Flight Readiness Review for the solid rocket boosters before launch the engineers of Morton Thiokol (the solid rocket booster manufacturer) objected to launch because of the detrimental effect of the cold temperatures on the o-rings in the solid rocket boosters. They had never launched in that cold of temperatures before and previous test data had shown erosion of the seals on previous flights. These concerns were not communicated by the Morton Thiokol management or NASA present at that flight readiness review to any of the higher level managers that got final approval on launch.

For Challenger it was a known issue and people specifically said "don't do this".

[0] https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm

[PaulHoule]

If it hadn’t been one thing it would have been another. The next two missions after STS-51-L were planned to have two shuttles on the pad simultaneously and both of them with thin-skinned liquid fuel upper stages in the cargo bays.

Charles Perron, in the book Normal Accidents warns of the tendency of people to subtract from the safety margin of a successful system in the pursuit of speed, performance, profits, etc.

It does boggle the mind however that with so much documentation for the Shuttle they never thought to specify a minimum launch temperature!