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>The title is saying we need to be careful because a tile was likely penetrated. To the point of the article, I think this is the wrong takeaway, meaning the slides were not communicating effectively. The second point illustrates this. It says the models were overpredicting the penetration. Meaning the models were conservative and the the actual penetration was likely less than what models show. They were setting the table for an optimistic outlook. The real issue, IMO, is highlighted later in the article where there isn't sufficient fidelity in the tests to back up those claims. Tests after the incident showed the foam acted very differently at the delta-v that actually occurred. And regarding your point about blaming contractors, the vast majority of work done by NASA is done by contractors. NASA is, to some extent, a pass-through organization that funds other organizations like Boeing, Lockheed, Honeywell, Jacobs, etc. >If you thought they didn't know, then ask them what they do know! This gets to the same cognitive biases that led to Challenger, EVA 23 and a host of smaller incidents nobody hears about. Data is not objectively weighed in these situations because of schedule pressure, optimism bias, etc. In this case, most launches were showing foam shedding with no issue, so it lead to a false belief that it wasn't dangerous even though it was out-of-spec. Add to that a slide that says the models are too conservative and you can see where cognitive biases may influence the decision. Lastly, most people like to think they're self-aware enough to identify these biases in real-time, but they aren't. It's also why the incident lead to a separate organization within NASA focused on safety, quality, and risk that has a segregated chain of command. |