[staticassertion]

You're confusing capabilities systems. Linux capabilities are not "capabilities", they're a misnomer. They're just groupings of privileges.

Here is what capabilities are.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security

I don't think what you're advocating for makes a ton of sense tbh. You're basically saying "just make it impossible to privesc", which, yeah, that would be nice... but it's not like you can just do that.

I think your point is more that least privilege should be more common - that way exploits have less impact. I agree. That said, Linux Capabilities are extremely coarse, and most container escapes involve owning the Kernel, which from a real Capabilities model would be the trusted broker of capabilities to begin with.

[stormbrew]

I am not accusing linux of having a real capability system, so nope I'm not confusing them at all. I'm honestly not sure where you got me saying that it does, my tweet is a criticism of linux (or really POSIX) and its lack of true capabilities.

Also, I used plan9 as an example for a reason. The kernel is quite hands off about capabilities in general in plan9, and is definitely not the primary source of trust in the system beyond the fact that a kernel is always a central trust node (some userspace processes like factotum and the authentication server do the real work and hold secure information).

There are systems out there that "just make it impossible to privesc", so it is possible. It's just not really possible within POSIX, because POSIX is built around it.

[staticassertion]

OK, I apologize - that was my misunderstanding, and I should have worded it as "I think you're confusing" rather than accusatory. I wouldn't hold it against anyone to do so - the naming collision is unfortunate and has been a source of confusion for as long as it has existed.

[stormbrew]

Oh yeah it is absolutely confusing, and I think it's done real harm to the concept to have it misused in linux so badly.