[mirashii]

There's a bunch of flawed assumptions hidden in this. Some examples:

* The distance between the user and the satellite is fixed. With a LEO system, the difference between a satellite being straight overhead at 400km elevation and at 10 degrees elevation over the horizon is a difference of 1000km. Passes at this elevation are minutes long, capping out around 15 minutes.

* The path from the satellite to the groundstation is fixed. Same reasoning above.

* A user in a fixed location's traffic would go through only a single groundstation to the internet. Unless that user is colocated with a groundstation, there's going to be periods of covisibility with different groundstations, so there's going to be wholly separate paths for the traffic to take. This varies even more as you start to look at polar satellites, which SpaceX has outfitted with optical crosslinks. Your traffic could be getting dumped onto the internet at groundsites thousands of kilometers away within the a single pass.

This isn't to say that there's zero chance of latency analysis from an adversary with enough internet presence, but it's many orders of magnitude harder than your simple analysis would suggest.

[ipodopt]

I was assuming geostationary satellite in example to point out that obscuring the IP could add a layer of security.

In regards to your general point I am making assumptions and it would be harder. But within an order of magnitude. A great place to use some basic machine learning.

In regards to LEO being harder... I agree the the latency analysis will have more moving pieces. But it being better in terms of resulting anonymity would depend on its implementation...