| > because there are no restrictions on things that just work with root, donation links for open source open geo data contribution platforms[1], roll your own payment scheme without giving anyone a cut, put ads in it if you like... Respectfully, that was not my point. The point was that having access to the source code fundamentally doesn't mean much. You can read more about why there since I don't want to open this debate again: https://seirdy.one/2022/02/02/floss-security.html > As does every web browser, but somehow banking on websites seems to very rarely be intercepted? Banking apps exist, and are required as a modern 2FA. Since 2021, strong 2FA is a requirement in the EU for banking operations. Mail clients also do this. DANE would be the ideal approach on web browsers. This might be up to a more general debate that doesn't belong here though. > Wouldn't it be nice if you could actually see what this app sends to Google about you? It's perfectly nice, and mitming is a great tool to ensure Google (and others) doesn't lie about what data they send. > Previously you'd add a cert to your OS and you'd be good to go. Now, this argument is rather moot though, since it's still doable. Not sure that the higher technical barrier would matter much, and most users will benefit from having certificate pinning anyway. Google is not doing this to prevent researchers to do their work. Nothing is permanently a blackbox anyhow. > Hah, the author just spent ~2800 words criticizing the liberal inclusion policy, missing api target enforcement, outdated (now slightly misleading) permission listings, lagging signature scheme update, and then concludes with "just download the apk from github because it has an Atom feed"! If only f-droid knew that this was the requirement for an endorsement by OP :D (jk) This is a bit exaggerated. I'm merely stating this is an alternative for "tech nerds", since Android enforces signature verification for app updates, so you once you ensured the authenticity, the source doesn't matter as much. This should be done with apksigner by the way, not tools like OpenGPG. I didn't feel the need to expand on this. > It depends.... how much does security matter to you? Is this to the exclusion of all other values? I rephrased this conclusion, since it was indeed a bit binary for my taste. This article wasn't meant to be openly shared on public platforms. This was bound to happen, but obviously I was not trying to make an article that should reach everyone. This is fine though, thanks for your comment. |
Update: I think you must have been caught in some automatic system because every comment (including your account's first) was already marked [dead] but not [flagged]. This does not seem to have been users flagging you or anything, maybe you use an IP previously used by a troll or so? Or a keyword detector in the first comment set it off (e.g. since the words "You're wrong," might trigger he-said, she-said conversation when taken by itself) maybe? Idk. /update.
> This is a bit exaggerated.
Yes, I was mostly joking in that cited part, that's why I added "(jk)" :). I understand there's much more to it than just that, it just read funnily to me. (Not meant as laughing 'at' you! Hope it didn't come across like that.)
> once you ensured the authenticity, the source doesn't matter as much.
Yes, but that's TOFU. Secure in most cases, but if it's used all the time, an attacker will catch today's lucky ten thousand (xkcd.com/1053) who first download a certain app or who just (re)installed their phone.
Hence my suggestion of something like PGP, where the authenticity can be established more reliably than having everyone hope it wasn't compromised on first download. (It's a good alarm mechanism though, if suddenly everyone else's update fails, so any compromise of app signing keys wouldn't be long-lived. But I do feel like the article argues for a much higher security standard than TOFU.)
Alternatively with f-droid, the CA system is used, and TOFU doesn't go away. If the CA system is compromised, there are still the app signing keys. Conversely, if the signing keys are compromised, the attacker also still needs to compromise the distribution channel or server.