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> According to the best current knowledge of humanity, it provides no information whatsoever. ??? My first guess has two green letters, or 8 bits of the hash are known. This excludes 255/256 of possible passwords-- so if there's a dictionary, it's way cut down. I also know for the other 30 digits a value that they are not-- this is about .1 bits apiece, for 3 more bits. And I get a few more bits from knowing the population count for each digit. One guess has reduced the search space by a factor of 10000+. If I say, know the word is in /usr/share/dict/words, the number of possibilities has dwindled from 230,000 to something around 20. Now, in this case, with a 14 character randomized password-- the amount of benefit is limited. The search space is still significantly shrunk by each guess, but in a way that is difficult to iterate. |
Can you enumerate the remaining 1/256th of the search space? Not with anything other than a brute force search, minus the one password you tried. The exact same brute force search that you would have needed to solve the problem in the first place. Your one password attempt has yielded one password's worth of knowledge. You, a human, don't have eight bits of information. You have almost nothing.
In principle, such a guess does eliminate 8 bits of information, but we have no way of manifesting that. In principle if we had a full list of the shortest passwords that led to the given hash, we could strike off the non-matching entries, but no human can do that. In principle an easier algorithm than the brute-force search exists, but we have no idea what it is, and we don't know what it would look like, whether it would be an incremental improvement over brute force or if there's hypothetically an algorithm that could do it on your cell phone in a couple of seconds or what.
Hashing and cryptography in general hide in this space between the theoretical information leakage and the practical inability to do anything with it. You have 8 theoretical bits and just shy of 0 real, practical bits.